The New Geopolitics of Technical Standardisation: A European Perspective  

Citation suggestion: Tim Rühlig, TR (2023). The New geopolitics of technical standardisation: A European perspective. Future Europe, 3(1), 102–109.

Abstract 

Technical standard-setting, long a domain of cooperation and competition among primarily private actors, has increasingly turned into a central arena of geopolitical rivalry. Technical standards are not a natural subject of geopolitical rivalry since they are essentially a piece of voluntary private self-regulation. But the growing footprint of China in international standardization based on the People’s Republic’s state-centric approach has contributed to a politicization of standard-setting. This has consequences far beyond technological development. The impact of standardization influence ranges from economic competitiveness to legal impact, national security and a discreet transformation of values enshrined in technologies. The European Union, a traditional technical standardization power needs to adapt to the new geopolitical realities without adopting China’s state-centric approach. 

Introduction 

Competition over technological leadership in emerging and foundational technologies, particularly those that enable digital transformation, has become the central arena of great power rivalry between the United States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As part of this trend, technical standardisation, traditionally a field of cooperation and commercial competition predominantly between private sector actors, is undergoing a process of politicisation. This is not to say that technical standards have been nonpolitical in the past. However, for several decades, states largely neglected technical standardisation as a field relevant to great power competition.¹ 

The new geopolitics of technical standardisation has three driving factors. First, digital transformation has penetrated many products and technologies. The growing interconnectedness of an ever-larger volume and diversity of things requires interoperability. Technical standards facilitate such interoperability, thereby becoming a central feature of a leading megatrend shaping our time. 

Second, China has identified the immense relevance of technical standard-setting and, accordingly, has increased its influence on standardisation. Furthermore, the country has also adopted a state-centric approach to standardisation. In the past, all major standardisation decisions followed a largely private-driven approach that generally shielded technical standardisation from direct political influence. In contrast, the PRC closely links policy goals to the development of technical standards.² 

Third, China’s growing footprint in technical standardisation and its state-centric approach have not gone unnoticed in the West, principally in the U.S. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are concerned about Chinese standardisation power, posing a risk of overreaction, namely, that the West will overestimate China’s power and modify its own approach in a way that further threatens the existing standardisation system.³ 

The new geopolitics of technical standardisation pose a particular dilemma for the European Union (EU) and its member states. Actors based in the EU, mostly companies, hold a strong position in many international standard-developing organisations (SDOs). While the EU must adapt to the situation, it also must ensure that it does not adopt China’s more political approach, as this would undermine its strengths and might even corrupt a system that has so far played to the EU’s advantage. 

This paper explains the new geopolitics of technical standardisation and presents the implications of this development for the EU. First, it discusses why the new geopolitics of technical standardisation are counterintuitive and a threat to the existing system. It then introduces the core features of China’s technical standardisation approach and assesses the PRC’s growing influence in international SDOs. The paper then elaborates on the relevance of technical standardisation for public actors, states, and the EU, distinguishing four dimensions in which technical standards entail political implications. Among these dimensions are the recently discussed legal, security, and value implications as well as the impact on competitiveness arising from the distribution and valuation of standard-essential patents (SEPs). The paper closes with a discussion of the policy implications for Europe. 

The new geopolitics of technical standardisation 

That standardisation has become an instrument of geopolitics is counterintuitive to those who have studied or participated in technical standard-setting in recent years. This is primarily due to the three features that characterise technical standards: their technical nature, the inclusivity of standard-setting, and their legally nonbinding status. 

Technical nature. Technical standards are omnipresent. They shape our lives, mostly without us even recognising them. We often only notice technical standards when they are not functioning properly. Take the example of power plugs. To this day, we need a power adapter to use electronic devices in some countries. We may be familiar with the names of other standards from their use in our everyday language. We hardly notice that USB, Wi-Fi, or A4 paper are all names of technical specifications adopted as international standards. The new mobile communications standard 5G, or standards for artificial intelligence algorithms, are less well known but are gaining ever more prominence in political debates. 

This is anything but obvious since the examples of USB, Wi-Fi, or 5G specifications already suggest that technical standards are highly technical. However, just as technology is not valueless, technical standards are political in nature. Largely invisible and unnoticed, they have a far-reaching influence on national security and the protection of human rights in the digital age (see below). 

Inclusivity of standardisation

Technical standards are universally accessible specifications that ensure interoperability and basic safety. They enable products and technologies to be used regardless of the manufacturer and across national borders. For example, we can only use mobile phones globally because there are technical standards for mobile communications. Therefore, standards promote trade and innovation and, in many cases, competition. Moreover, even if technical standards include patented technology, patent holders are obliged to licence it under fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) conditions; that is, technical standards cannot exclude anyone from access. 

Similarly, the process of standard development is inclusive. A high degree of transparency, openness, and consensus shape most SDOs; indeed, these criteria are required even when an SDO is considered international under global trade law, as defined by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) under the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁴ 

From this, it can be concluded that the origin of technical standards is irrelevant. Technical standard-setting is inclusive and transparent, and the resultant standards are available to all. However, in reality, the ecosystem in which technical standards are developed does matter as it shapes the content of standards, and the distributional effects can be significant even under FRAND terms. 

Legal status

Technical standards are not legally binding. Formal standards are developed by private standardisation organisations, primarily representing the private sector’s interests. The consensus principle applies to many of them. De facto standards are the result of market dominance. The operating systems of Microsoft and Apple are so widespread that software must be compatible with Microsoft and Apple specifications to avoid becoming niche products. Windows and iOS are, therefore, considered de facto standards. 

Thus, while standards might be nonbinding, they have enormous force, particularly once they gain market acceptance and are broadly applied. 

In sum, technical standards may not be an obvious dimension of great power rivalry since they are highly technical, inclusive, and nonbinding. However, because their political importance is not evident at first glance, they have taken on a particularly discreet form of political influence. Due to the long-lasting nature of technical standards, they are discreet and potentially transformative. 

China’s state-directed standardisation and its influence 

The PRC has developed into an international technical standardisation power. This is the result of China’s growing technological innovativeness and internal reforms of the domestic standardisation system. China has carefully studied Western standardisation practices, learned selectively, and prioritised standard-setting.⁵ China’s leadership has understood the strategic relevance of technical standardisation. For example, in a highly unusual move, the PRC’s new “Standardization Outline,” the country’s standardisation strategy, was published by the government jointly with the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which seldom issues papers on such detailed and technical issues.⁶ 

In recent years, China has transformed from a state-controlled to a state-centric approach to technical standardisation. Previously, technical standardisation in China was fully controlled by the party-state. Since 2018, China has introduced a two-tier standardisation system that combines the state and the market.⁷ This reform results from China’s understanding that its previous system would not have allowed for significant international influence. As a result, the PRC has carefully studied the successful U.S. and European approaches and adapted them to its own state-driven economy. 

At the same time, all segments of China’s technical standardisation system remain under the close guidance of the party-state, which uses formal and informal mechanisms to steer all standardisation activities and actors involved. Examples range from formal coordination mechanisms in strategic sectors, such as wireless mobile standardisation, to financial incentives, such as subsidies and stipends, or informal standardisation guidance from party-state officials to private-led standardisation organs. This allows China’s policymakers to link strategic policy objectives to domestic technical standard-setting.⁸ 

China has understood that technical standardisation inherently works by a cooperative logic of action. However, the PRC skillfully exploits growing innovativeness and injects strategic objectives into the process. Foreign enterprises continue to face an uneven playing field. In a recently published comprehensive study, European companies operating in China reported a long list of obstacles to their participation in domestic standardisation within the PRC. Foreign-invested companies are provided selective access to domestic standard-setting where it is in China’s strategic interest.⁹ 

China’s internal reforms have boosted its international ambitions since more involvement by private sector actors enhances Chinese influence, while the party-state’s coordination and facilitation helped China to submit a high number of proposals that would find unified support from Chinese actors. As a result, China’s influence on international technical standardisation has increased significantly; nevertheless, this growth has not occurred evenly in all international SDOs or on all fronts regarding de facto standard-setting. Consider the following examples: 

• China’s influence in the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is unparalleled. In the ITU’s most central institution for standardisation, the ITU-T, China is well positioned. In the study period lasting from 2022 to 2024, China filled one of the 11 study group chair positions. Only Japan and South Korea have received more chairmanships (two each); the remaining six chair positions are distributed among the six states. Of the much higher number of study group vice-chairs, China secured 8.7%, ahead of South Korea (7.7%), Argentina, Japan, and India (5.8% each). China’s share of leadership positions in the ITU-T working groups (including the Conformity Assessment Steering Committee) is even greater. With 24.2%, China has the largest share of chairmanships, followed by Japan (15.2%) and South Korea (12.1%). If the vice-chairs are taken into account, China’s leadership becomes even clearer. While China’s share amounts to 23.5%, Great Britain (9.8%), Argentina, and Tunisia (7.8% each) follow at a great distance. Compared to the previous study phase of 2017–2021, China has maintained its influence in the ITU-T, despite losing the chairmanship of a study group, and its share of vice-chairs in the study groups falling minimally from 9.1% to 8.7%. But in the working groups, China could still slightly expand its share. As a result, by 2021, China held 23.3% of chairmanships and 18.4% of vice-chairmanships.¹⁰ Study groups and working groups of the ITU-T both develop standards and technical recommendations, albeit at different layers of technical specificity. 
• In the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), China’s influence has also grown, although it does not dominate. The ISO is the world’s leading International Standardisation Organisation with a broad technical mandate. The IEC is the most important international standard-developing organisation in the electrotechnical field. 3GPP, in turn, shapes technical standards in the telecommunications field. China holds a growing share of the technical leadership positions in the technical committees, subcommittees, and working groups where the standards are developed. As of August 2022, China had 76 secretariats in the ISO and 12 secretariats in the IEC. These are significantly fewer secretariats than those held by leading Western countries. Germany, for example, has 131 ISO and 37 IEC secretariats, the U.S. has 92 (ISO) and 27 (IEC) positions, and France holds 81 (ISO) and 22 (IEC). Japan (80 in ISO, 23 in IEC) and Great Britain (76 ISO secretariats and 20 positions in IEC), as well as Italy in the case of the IEC (14 secretariats), also rank ahead of China. Nevertheless, China’s influence is growing. From 2011 to 2018, the proportion of China’s ISO secretariats in technical committees and subcommittees increased from 5.0% to 8.21%. By 2022, this share had risen again to 9.43%.¹¹ However, China’s influence has tended to be more limited in international industry consortia that develop technical standards, such as the IEEE or the IETF.¹² 
• The PRC has invested enormous resources in its international standardisation efforts outside established SDOs. This represents Chinese efforts to establish de facto standards internationally. As part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has established plans to promote Chinese technical standards and has concluded bilateral standardisation agreements with BRI countries.¹³ When the results have been mixed, China increasingly incorporated technical standards into concrete BRI projects. Nevertheless, since this may create lock-in dependencies (see below), recipient countries have grown sceptical of such practices in recent years. 

That China has gained influence across the board, although to different degrees, and is changing the nature of standard-setting. China is externalising its state-directed approach by active party-state involvement. Unlike most other international efforts, Chinese standardisation is shaped by the party-state’s agenda. 

Risks resulting from China’s technical standardisation power 

China’s technical standardisation power enables the party-state to surpass mere technical standard-setting in at least four different ways. 

• Economic competitiveness: Although technical standards are widely available, they come with significant distribution effects. Growing interconnectedness requires interoperability provided by information and communication technology (ICT) standards. A high degree of ICT standards is patented—approximately 55%.¹⁴ While it is true that patent holders are obliged to licence them under FRAND conditions, the fees can be substantial. For example, the U.S. technology giant Qualcomm generated about €5.2 billion from licensing in 2017,¹⁵ representing more than 20% of the company’s profit. Both the distribution of and the value of these SEPs will be significant for future competitiveness as they may become a de facto global tax on all types of connected devices. Chinese tech giants are well-placed to gain a tremendous share of these royalty payments. 

In addition, companies whose technological innovations have not been promoted to the level of technical standards must pay licence fees and bear adaptation costs. This is because technologies and products can only become internationally competitive if they are redesigned to be compatible with the technical standards of global markets. These technical adaptation measures can be costly and lengthy. 

• Regulatory and legal influence: Technical standards of large markets can unfold extraterritorial effects, particularly when closely aligned with regulations, since multinational companies seek to avoid several parallel modes of production that adapt to different standard ecosystems. China has only recently proclaimed that it will further increase the citation of technical standards in laws and legally binding regulations.¹⁶ This means compliance with these laws and regulations will be considered a given when the respective technical standards are implemented. Compliance with laws and regulations while circumventing technical standards is possible, yet often very costly. Since companies with global operations want to avoid manufacturing the same product based on divergent standards, it is not uncommon for the strictest standards to be adopted as the benchmark and applied across their global production. Although voluntary, technical standards have an impact that extends far beyond the jurisdiction in which the standard was developed (extraterritorial effect). 

International standards are also references in disputes regarding TBT under international trade law. According to the WTO’s TBT Agreement, compliance with international standards is an indication of the nondiscriminatory facilitation of free trade. Deviations must be explained. Given that technical standards and related regulations apply to more than 80% of globally traded goods, international technical standards play a significant role in shaping world trade law.¹⁷ 

• Security implications: In international SDOs, standards have a transparent review mechanism. Built-in security flaws are difficult to hide from international peers; when successful, vulnerabilities in international standards spread globally. Decisions regarding which components of a technology are standardised and which are not can have crucial security implications. Generally, companies that have developed technology have the most comprehensive technical knowledge, including its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. When a technical solution becomes an international standard, it often spreads globally. Should the now globalised standard contain security vulnerabilities, it is possible that the actors who developed it will be able to exploit these vulnerabilities particularly effectively, which could undermine the cyber, network, or even IT security of the critical digital infrastructure.¹⁸ 

Where standards are not global in nature, they can create politically impactful lock-in dependencies, particularly in critical infrastructure standards. Standards create markets but only lead to interoperability in the geographic areas where they are applied. If technical standards are global, they create a global market; however, when competing technical standards are applied in different geographical locations, the world becomes divided into several independent technological spheres. In some cases, divergent standards are a nuisance but only hinder the exchange of technologies and goods to a limited extent.¹⁹ Different global electrical plug standards can be overcome with adapters. Different railway gauges mean that goods have to be loaded from one train to another or onto a truck. But other cases are more complex with potentially far-reaching consequences. For example, the existing discrepancies in global railway signalling standards mean that railway networks can only be interconnected if they use identical standards. Divergent standards for transferring data prevent companies from offering their services globally. China strives to actively export its technical standards, not least by means of the BRI. If critical infrastructure is based on a specific standard that is only used by providers from one State, then dependencies arise in the maintenance and further expansion of that particular infrastructure. In cases where the deviations in standards are complex, both can only be delivered by providers from the country that has built the corresponding critical infrastructure based on its own national standards. Resulting in technological dependencies on state-owned or state-affiliated enterprise can also be used to achieve security policy goals. It is questionable, for example, whether a country whose maintenance of critical infrastructure depends on Chinese state-owned enterprises can take a critical position toward the PRC in matters of core Chinese interests. 

• Discreet value transmission: Just as technology is not value-neutral, technical standards discreetly spread political and societal values. A few years ago, for example, two technical standards for wireless area network (WLAN) technology were competing for international recognition. The already established Western Wi-Fi standard promised to better protect privacy but performed less well than its Chinese competitor WAPI. Had WAPI prevailed, not only would a lower level of privacy have been widely incorporated into devices, but this would also have been widely regarded as normal. This is one of the reasons why technical standards have been described as social institutions.²⁰ The acceptance of Chinese standards can spread China’s values regionally or even globally, and once adopted, standards and their inherent values remain largely unchallenged. 

As digital transformation permeates greater areas of public and private life, the ethical aspects of technical standards are becoming increasingly central. In particular, questions regarding artificial intelligence standardisation face ethical challenges, with standards for algorithms being the best-known examples. Chinese efforts to standardise artificial intelligence-based facial recognition, for example, have attracted attention.21 As the political, social, ethical, and legal beliefs and frameworks in China on surveillance are fundamentally different from those in Europe, there is concern that international standards may not be compatible with Europe’s liberal values. In this case, Chinese technical standards could globalise acceptance of comprehensive surveillance and also bring it to Europe. Even more fundamental is the problem that artificial intelligence is not static but constantly evolving. Developing standards for dynamic processes and certifying them is still an unresolved challenge. Another example is the effort to create a new internet protocol. Admittedly, the much-discussed fears in 2020 that China could impose a new, more centralised internet protocol quickly were exaggerated.²² However, fundamental differences in ideas about how a new internet protocol should be designed and how governments should exercise control are evident. 

These four dimensions point to the transformative politicisation of technical standard-setting of China’s state-directed approach. This could result in further fragmentation of the global standardisation system that—apart from the above risks—may result in shrinking market opportunities and less global innovation. 

Policy recommendations to the EU 

Technical standard-setting has become a central dimension of great power rivalry. The EU’s traditional strength in technical standardisation stems from its private sector-driven approach in a fairly nonpolitical standardisation system that is currently at risk. The challenge for the EU is to adapt to the existing challenges without adopting China’s state-directed approach that would further politicise the system, eroding the EU’s strengths. 

Given that technical standard-setting has enormous implications for the competitiveness of European companies, carries legal and security implications, and shapes values, EU policymakers need to act. The European Commission has taken the first step by publishing a new European Standardization Strategy in February 2022 that is now to be implemented.²³ This process could profit from the following recommendations: 

• Adapt a multistakeholder approach to the new realities: As part of its new strategy, the European Commission will establish a new High-level Form on Standardisation that consists of an annual ministerial summit and brings together private and public stakeholders. The success of such activities will be crucial since Europe will need to preserve the private-led system but also inject policy priorities. This requires close coordination between the private sector and European policymakers. Europe’s future success hinges on all sides taking the new Forum seriously. 
• Establish alert trackers for China’s domestic and international standardisation activities: Since most aspects of technical standard-setting have no political relevance, European policymakers must properly identify areas of relevance, i.e., those that carry significant implications for one of the above-introduced four dimensions. This requires tracking and analysing Chinese standardisation activities. Ideally, this could be done in close coordination with like-minded partners, including the U.S. Given the highly technical character of standard contributions, it is not always easy to identify their political implications. The EU should invest in tracking mechanisms and closely exchange information on domestic and international standardisation contributions from the PRC as part of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). 
• Inject policy concerns in standard-setting without corrupting the system: Based on such tracking, the EU must inject policy concerns without turning a highly technical and inherently cooperative standardisation system into a platform for political rivalry with the PRC. Intra-EU processes of stakeholder coordination with all actors of the standardisation community aiming to raise awareness could be coupled by a similar transatlantic process. Where private stakeholders turn out to be unwilling or incapable of properly addressing policy concerns, either private nonprofit organisations should be funded or technically capable government officials should be sent to relevant international SDOs. This requires attracting more technical expertise to the European Commission and EU member state bureaucracies. 
• Coordinate relevant regulation of emerging technologies wherever possible: While regulatory preferences do and will remain not fully aligned on both sides of the Atlantic, early signalling of regulatory frameworks can effectively steer international standardisation. This is more effective if the transatlantic partners succeed in aligning their regulatory preferences. 
• Develop a common, balanced EU approach to SEPs: Striking a balance between limiting the burden of SEP royalties for a broad range of products and adequately monetising groundbreaking innovation is difficult and will turn out to be one of the major issues shaping global competitiveness in the digital age. A balanced position is difficult to achieve within the EU and requires coordination with like-minded partners. If Europe and like-minded partners succeed in developing a common approach that considers strategic objectives, it could shape the global environment in line with European interests. Alignment on China’s anti-suit injunction, i.e., the legal claim that disputes over SEPs can only be brought before Chinese courts, could be a start to cooperation in a complex field. The Chinese anti-suit injunction is worth challenging because it will favour Chinese companies, and China’s judiciary is not independent. 
• Incentivize R&D in emerging technologies and the development of standard contributions: The EU must improve its innovation ecosystem in which technical standardisation contributions are being developed. This will require a broad set of policy instruments, from increased R&D funding to deregulation or tax incentives for innovation. These measures should be coupled with direct incentives for turning innovation into standard contributions. 
• Invest in technical standardisation education: While China has invested massively (though not always effectively) in technical standardisation education, western companies increasingly face a shortage of qualified personnel. The EU should coordinate investments in systematic standardisation education through advanced training and as an integral part of existing engineering education. 
• Incentivize China’s participation in existing international SDOs and insist on reciprocity: China is an innovation powerhouse that will shape international technical standards, whether the world likes it or not. Thus, it is in our interest to keep China within the existing institutions and make it play by established rules. The PRC continues to be interested in Western support that should be provided under the condition of strict adherence to international rules and practices, coupled with a demand for reciprocity. Part of the engagement process could also be advocating for China to develop agreements with the ISO and the IEC that resemble the Vienna and Frankfurt Agreements of the European Standardisation Organisations. 

Europe is in the relatively comfortable position of punching above its economic weight in technical standard-setting. Coupled with the fact that technical standardisation inherently requires a certain degree of cooperation, Europe’s strength is an incentive for both the U.S. and China to cooperate with the EU. However, European interests will never be completely fulfilled. China might move closer to reciprocity but will not provide equal access to European actors. Standardisation cooperation with the U.S. is progressing and is often named one of the most successful tracks within the TTC. However, the U.S. and European approaches will never fully align. For this reason, Europe must protect the strengths of its own system through several measures, some of which have been listed above. 

Endnotes

1. J. Seaman (2020), ‘China and the new geopolitics of technical standardization’, Ifri, 27 January, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/seaman_china_standardization_2020.pdf. D. Russel and B.H. Berger (2021), ‘Stacking the Deck: China’s influence in international technology standards setting’, Asia Society Policy Institute, 3 November, https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/ASPI_StacktheDeckreport_final.pdf.
2. T. Rühlig (2020), ‘Technical standardization, China, and the future international order’, the Böll Foundation, 3 March, https://eu.boell.org/en/2020/03/03/technical-standardisation-china-
   and-future-international-order.
3. T. Rühlig (2022), ‘Technical standardization and innovation in a changing geopolitical landscape, in: E. Deiaco and J. Wernberg (eds.), Rethinking boundaries and revisiting borders. Conditions for innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic integration in an interconnected world (Stockholm:
   The Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum), 105-132.
4. C. Dackö (2021), ‘What makes a Technical Specification a WTO Compliant Standard?’, Mannheim Swartling, 13 April, https://www. mannheimerswartling.se/app/uploads/2021/04/what-makes-a-technical-specification-a-wto-compliant-standard.pdf.
5. T. Rühlig and T. ten Brink (2021), ‘The externalization of China’s technical standardization approach’, Development & Change, 52(5), 1196-https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12685
6. Chinese State Council (2021), ‘中共中央 国务 院印发《国家标准化发展纲要》’ [‘The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued the “National Standardization Development Outline”’], Xinhua, 10 October, http://www.news.cn/politics/zywj/2021-10/10/c_1127943309.htm.
7. J. Seaman (2020), ‘China and the new geopolitics of technical standardization’, Ifri, 27 January, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/ files/seaman_china_standardization_2020.pdf.
   115 V. Pop et al. (2021), ‘From Lightbulbs to 5G, China Battles West for Control of Vital Technology Standards’, Wall Street Journal, 8 February, https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-lightbulbsto-
   5g-china-battles-west-for-control-of-vitaltechnology-standards-11612722698.
8. T. Rühlig (2021), ‘The shape of things to come. The race to control technical standardization,’ European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2 December, https://static.europeanchamber.com.cn/upload/documents/documents/The_Shape_of_Things_to_Come_English_Final%5b966%5d.pdf.
9. All calculations are based on information obtained from the official website of the ITU.
10. All calculations are based on information obtained from the official website of the ISO and IEC.
11. S. Teleanu (2021), ‚The geopolitics of digital standards. China’s role in standard-setting organizations’, the Diplo Foundation, 14 December, https://www.diplomacy.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Geopolitics-of-digital-standards-Dec-2021.pdf.
12. Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (2018), ‘工业和信息化部关于工业通信业标准化工作服务于“一带一路”建设的实施意见’ [231 Opinion on the Implementation of Standardization of the Industrial Communication Industry for Construction of the ‘Belt and Road’), Law-lib.com, 5 November 2018, http://www.law-lib.com/Law/law_view.asp?id=636486. Standards Administration of China (2018), ‘标准联通共建“一带一路”行动计划(2018-2020年)’ [Harmonization of Standards for Construction of ‘BRI’ Action Plan (2018–2020)], SAC, http://www.sac.gov.cn/zt/ydyl/bzhyw/201801/t20180119_341413.htm.
13. Estimation according to the IPlytics webinar: “SSOs, IPR Policies, Patent Pools and SEP Licensing”,
    11 August 2020.
14. D. Strumpf (2019), ‘Where China dominates in 5G technology’, The Wall Street Journal, 26 February,
    https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-china-dominates-in-5g-technology-11551236701.
15. State Administration for Market Regulation (2021), ‘“十四五”推动高质量发展的国家标准体系建设规划’ [“14th Five-Year” Plan for Promoting the High-Quality Development of the National Standards System’], SAMR, December, https://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/bzjss/202112/W020211215387457412370.pdf.
16. OECD (2019), ‘Regulatory Reform and International Standardisation’, Working Party of the Trade Committee, TD/TC/WP(98)/FINAL (1999).
17. M. Medin and G. Louie (2019), ‘The 5G ecosystem. Risks and opportunities for DoD’, Defense
    Innovation Board, 3 April, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF.
18. J-P. Bonardi and R. Durand (2003), ‘Managing network effects in high-tech markets’, The
    Academy of Management Journal, (17)4, 40-52. W.B. Arthur (1989), ‘Competing technologies,
    increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events’, The Economic Journal, 99(394), 116-131.
19. R.P. Suttmeier et al. (2006), ‘Standards of power? Technology, institutions, and politics
    in the development of China’s national standards strategy’, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 1 June, https://www.nbr.org/publication/standards-of-power-technology-institutions-and-politics-in-the-development-of-chinas-national-standards-strategy/. S. Krislov (1997), How nations choose product standards and standards change nations (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press). K. Tamm Hallström (2004), Organizing international standardization. ISO and the IASC in quest of authority (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
20. J. Seaman (2020), ‘China and the new geopolitics of technical standardization’, Ifri, 27 January, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/ files/seaman_china_standardization_2020.pdf. J. Synge and N. Liu (2020), ‘From AI to facial recognition. How China is setting the rules in new tech’, Financial Times, 7 October, https://www.ft.com/content/188d86df-6e82-47eba134-2e1e45c777b6.
21. N. Godehardt and D. Voelsen (2020), NewIP – Grundstein für ein globales Internet nach chinesischen
    Vorstellungen?‘, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 7 May, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/newip-grundstein-fuer-ein-globales-internet-nach-chinesischen-vorstellungen.
22. European Commission (2022), ‘An EU Strategy on Standardization – Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green, and digital EU single market’, European Commission, 1 February https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48598.

References 

Arthur, W. B. (1989). ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events’. The Economic Journal, 99(394), 116–131. 

Bonardi, J.-P. § R. Durand (2003). ‘Managing Network Effects in High-Tech Markets’. The Academy of Management Journal, (17)4, 40–52. 

Chinese State Council (2021). ‘中共中央 国务院印发《国家标准化发展纲要’ [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued the “National Standardization Development Outline”]. Xinhua, 10 October, http://www.news.cn/politics/zywj/2021-10/10/c_1127943309.htm. 

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