Alarming Populist Threats in Europe

The Rise of Far-Right and Far-left Parties and Lessons from Their Competing Positions Towards Russia’s Aggression War against Ukraine   

Introduction 

Recent election results (see Politico n.y.a) across Europe make it clear: populist parties, both right- and left-wing populist, are currently appealing to more voters with simplified, polarising, and even polemical answers to complex problems.ⁱ Just to name some, the German right-wing populist party AfD gained 10.3 % at the parliamentary elections in 2021, the German Linke (Left) 4.9 % (before its dissolution in 2023). The Austrian right-populist party FPÖ gained 16.2 % in the Austrian parliamentary elections, while in Hungary, the ruling right-wing-populist party Fidesz gained 54.1 % in the parliamentary elections in 2022. (Nadjivan et al., 2023). In Poland, the long-year ruling right-wing-populist party PiS, for the first time, lost 8.2 % of votes compared to 2019. With 35.4 % it is still the party with the most votes, but in opposition due to the finally successful coalition negotiations among the (mostly) liberal-democratic parties (Politico, n.y.b). 

However, both right-wing and left-wing populist parties benefit from social dissatisfaction. After left-wing populists profited from the financial and economic crisis since 2007 and the then necessary EU fiscal policy since 2010, it was the migration (policy) crisis with its peak in 2015 right-wing populists could instrumentalise for their nationalist power interests. In government, especially right-wing populists torpedo a common European foreign, security and defence policy as the Fidesz regime in Hungary and former PiS regime in Poland have shown.  

Moreover, populist parties, either right or left-wing, pose a serious threat not only to liberal democracy but also to security in the whole of Europe. Since the start of Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it has become clear that Russia has for years forged a hybrid war against Europe. This includes disinformation and fake news as well as infiltration by financing anti-democratic populist parties, which serve as Putin’s mouthpieces within Europe. Depending on their concrete position, either in national government or opposition, or even in European parliament, they are able to influence the public by pro-Russian propaganda, or to block a common foreign, security and defence policy. 

From the angle of motivation to support Russia, the boundaries between right-wing and left-wing populist parties are blurring, while a new collaboration space among them has emerged.

To gain a Europe-wide overview, the comparative analysis includes 25 right-wing and left-wing populist parties from 13 EU-member countries,ⁱⁱ and reveals their concrete threat to liberal democracy and security in Europe as well as the necessary steps to take against anti-democratic and anti-European infiltration. 

1. The Populist Self-Legitimation and Polarising Narratives 

An ideal playground for rising populism is maintained by the current polycrisis, or even “permacrisis” (Schneider, 2022), including the simultaneous raging of several crises such as the so-called refugee crisis since 2015 or migration (policy) crisis (despite different legal regulations), the Coronavirus / Covid19 crisis and its aftermath since 2020, and since 2022 the international consequences of the Russian aggression war against Ukraine, the energy supply crisis as well as high inflation rates across Europe. (Prausmüller 2023) 

In their orientation and agitation, all the 25 compared parties refer to the same basic populist patterns: 1) They pretend to speak for the people and portray those as a homogenous population. 2) They distinguish themselves from an imagined enemy that, at the same time, serves as a scapegoat for all problems. 3) With such friend-enemy images, they ignore complex political, economic and social contexts and instead promise simple solutions that cannot stand up to real circumstances. The host ideology is usually nationalism and nativism, meaning favouring native inhabitants as opposed to immigrants (Rabinowitz, 2023) on the right and socialism as well as anti-capitalism on the left side (Mudde, 2020, 15). They all share the same linkage to social dissatisfaction and the individual feeling of injustice and being disadvantaged (Möller, 2021: 11).  

1.1. Nativist Narratives on the Right and Anti-capitalism Narratives on the Left 

According to the (far) right-wing populist and nativist self-image, immigrants and refugees would threaten the autochthonous, or native European population, as they would replace them in the long term. The ideological and at the same time scandalous term for such a discriminating discourse has been invented by the French philosopher Renaud Camus with his book “Le Grand Remplacement” (“The Great Replacement”), published in France in 2011 (Camus, 2019). The right-wing populist parties analysed here refer to his paranoid image of the threatening “Islamisation of Europe” (Ekman, 2022). 

Apart from those – by right-wing populists perceived – external enemies, internal so-called threats or enemies are social pluralism, multiculturalism, feminism and abortion rights as well as the LGBTIQ+ community. Accompanied by antifeminist mobilisation (Sauer, 2019), EU law violating restrictions on abortion rights and same-sex partnerships have been introduced in Hungary and especially Poland with tragic consequences (Sauer, Inotai, 2023). In Italy and more recently in Austria, right-wing populists have started to question abortion rights (Straub, 2023; Ruep, 2023). 

A Europe-wide comparison shows that there are more right-wing than left-wing populist parties across Europe. They have gained more votes than the left-wing populist forces in recent years, (Ey, 2023). Within left-wing populism, the fundamentally negative attitude towards capitalism often gives rise to a fundamental argumentative criticism of the existing democratic conditions. As with right-wing populism, this is based on a criticism of the entire political and economic elite (Meijers & Zaslove, 2021) and the polemic that democratic institutions are secretly controlled by “the corporations”, “the rich” and “international finance capital” so that the interests of the citizens would be betrayed herein (Fücks, 2017: 79), as e.g. the rhetoric of the former German Linke and La France Insoumise clearly show (Nadjivan et al. 2023). 

2. Different Scope of Action through National Positions 

In opposition, populist parties often pressure centrist governments with inflammatory rhetoric, as in case of the Austrian FPÖ, German AfD or French Rassemblement National (RN) (Bauer 2023). As coalition partners, they appear overwhelmed by the challenges of complex problems such as financial difficulties and a necessary fiscal policy as in the case of the left-wing populist Italian Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement, M5S), the Spanish Podemos and Greek Syriza (Nadjivan et al. 2023). When in power in national governments, especially right-wing populist parties try to consolidate their power through anti-pluralist and autocratic policies. Having reached such a power position, they prove to be a real threat to liberal democracy and European integration. As the cases of Hungary and previously Poland show, the principles of human rights, checks and balances as well as media freedom have been eroded by right-wing populist parties (Bauer 2023). 

On the European level, against the background of the European Parliament elections on 9 June 2024, the far-right political groups of the European Parliament, the former Identity and Democracy Group (ID), previously including f.i. the Austrian FPÖ, German AfD, French RN and Dutch PVV, and the European Conservative and Reformists Group (ECR) under the post-fascist Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni threaten the hitherto European integration and prosperity (Nadjivan, Sustala 2024). The same is true for the newly formed far-right Patriots for Europe group. All hitherto oppositional European far-right groups plan to reform or reconstruct Europe in the sense of bringing back the decision-making on national levels as a threatening backward step. While the previous ID and now Patriots for Europe group, and especially the Austrian FPÖ, propagate a dystopian “Europe of free peoples and fatherlands” (FPÖ n.y.), the Italian PM Giorgia Meloni plans to reconstruct Europe according to the Italian model, which means to “send the left into opposition even in the EU” and to form a centre-right government with a united far-right block (Camut 2024). 

2.1. Negative Campaigning from Right-wing Opposition 

With their high-profile performance and propagandist demands, right-wing populist parties continuously put pressure on those in power, and parallelly prepare for the day (Bauer, 2023; Nadjivan et al., 2023) when they will sit at the levers of power, on national level as well as on the European one. This is the case for right-wing populists in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Greece and Bulgaria. 

As the most popular right-wing populist in France, Marine le Pen from Rassemblement National (RN) exploits the fear of foreign infiltration in the autochthonous, or native society and population by performing as a national mother figure (Decker, 2023, 99; Bernarding, 2019). Her ID Group ally in the Netherlands, the far-right populist Geert Wilders with his primarily one-man party PVV has – with regards to previous opinion polls – surprisingly won the elections in November 2023 (Schaart et al., 2023). According to Politico’s Poll of Polls (see Politico n.y.) the German far-right AfD might win more votes than the ruling social-democratic party SPD. In Spain, Greece and Italy, as first Mediterranean arrival countries for many refugees and migrants, far-right parties have been able to capitalise on the migration (policy) crisis. In contrast to Italy, in Spain and Greece, they have for now been kept out of governmental positions. (Kassam, 2023; Papadimitriou, 2023). In Bulgaria, the EU member state with the lowest GDP, the far-right party Vazrazhdane (Rebirth) has been benefiting from a serious political crisis since 2021 (Popiwanow, 2023), but for now remained in opposition. 

2.2. Divergences in Left-wing Opposition and Government 

The most consistent common thread in left-wing populist ideology is primarily a distinctive anti-capitalism, including an offensive anti-Americanism. For instance, the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ and KPÖ plus), Dutch SP, German Linke and French far-left La France Insoumise share the same anti-capitalist and EU-sceptic stance regarding socio-economic inequalities, but they have different views on immigration. (Waschinski, 2022) It is especially the Dutch SP that opposes immigration for the sake of Dutch natives (World Today 2023) – similar to right-wing populist narratives. 

In Italy, the first rising star M5S with an inconsistent immigration policy has soon been involved in coalition governments disputes that several times have led to governmental dissolution (Rüb, 2022) and finally paved the way for the post-fascist government under Giorgia Meloni (ktz & aar & dpa, 2022) with possibly serious consequences for liberal democracy in Europe (Broder 2022). 

2.3. On the way to Autocracy under Right-wing Populist Governments 

Hungary and Poland have experienced the consequences of right-wing populist parties ruling for more than ten years, that rely on connections to the far-right and the extremist fringe of the political spectrum. In the latest Freedom House Reports (2022, 2023) both countries are no longer defined as functioning democracies. In V-Dem’s democracy index published in 2023, Poland is – after Kosovo, Colombia and Georgia – ranked at 78th and Hungary even worse at 94th place (V-Dem, 2023; Schwarzer, 2022: 145 f.). 

Both countries have faced similar strategies and methods used by populist ruling parties to transform hitherto democracies into autocracies, starting with restrictions against independent judiciary and independent media, and against civil rights such as LGBTIQ+ and women’s rights. (Bauer, 2023: 196; Dolna, 2023; Pędziwol, 2023). And in both countries, being also NATO members, the autocratic Fidesz and PiS regimes have for years prevented a common foreign, security and also migration policy, as they prioritised their own national interests opposed to European cohesion (Balfour, Lehne, 2024). Moreover, they used to back each other on the European level. So, the Article 7 proceedings (for violation of EU values), the European Commission has started against both countries, have still been going on due to their joint blocking (Tamma, 2022). In Hungary’s case (Lynch, 2024), the EU has even freezed funding due to human rights and rule of law concerns (Hanke Vela, Chiappa, 2024). The fact that the European Commission paid originally frozen money to Hungary without the permission of the European Parliament might have legal consequences for the Commission (ibd.). 

Hungary’s relation to Poland however changed first due to Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine since 2022 and secondly due to the new liberal-democratic government under Donald Tusk since 2023. As a result, Poland supports a common European security and defence policy, and European military aid to Ukraine. On the contrary, Hungary together with his new ally Slovakia, also a NATO member, neglects any common European approach against the Russian warmonger (Przybylski, 2024). In Slovakia, the former Prime Minister Robert Fico won elections again with his left-wing populist party SMER, establishing a coalition with the ultra-nationalist SNS in October 2023. His government quickly announced new restrictions on independent media (Bayer, 2023), but 2024 changed to a pro-Ukrainian rhetoric. For probably rebuilding his “mafia state” (Allweiss, 2024) without any European interference, he has at least officially adopted the pro-Ukrainian position of EU decisionmakers (ibid.). 

3. Competing Positions towards Russia and its War 

Three types of positions can be identified: 1) a clearly pro-Ukrainian, 2) an ambivalent and 3) a pro-Russian position. The latter is a dangerous gateway for the spread of Russian propaganda and disinformation, and thus, hybrid war (Bachmann, Gunneriusson, 2015) against Western values and liberal democracies. From the angle of motivations to support Russia, the boundaries between right-wing and left-wing populist parties are blurring. 

3.1. The pro-Ukrainian Position 

Those populist parties and politicians who have not previously maintained any close relationship with Russia or Putin are firmly on the side of attacked Ukraine. These include, above all, the Polish PiS and Finnish party Perussuomalaiset, two parties evolving in countries located in the immediate vicinity of Russia and Ukraine and are, therefore, directly affected by the acts of war and their consequences. In Poland, a NATO member for several years, everyone unanimously shares the view that Russia is the aggressor and mostly supports assistance to Ukraine (Euronews, 2023). Finland, which was previously neutral, quickly, on 4 April 2023, became a NATO member to avoid the possible danger of being attacked itself (Lahti & Palonen, 2023).  In Sweden, the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats also from the beginning supported the NATO accession process, initiated by the Swedish government (Tsp & AFP, 2023). On 7 March 2024, Sweden finally became the 32^nd NATO member (Barth, 2024). 

Even Giorgia Meloni, despite her post-fascist orientation, has taken a clear pro-Ukrainian stance, however in contrast to both of her coalition partners Lega and Forza Italia (Henneberger, 2022; Wermke, 2022; Kathe, 2023). Solidarity with Ukraine, combined with the willingness to provide financial, humanitarian, and military help, remains unbroken among these right-wing populist parties. However, not all far-right parties share this stance. 

3.2. The Ambivalent Position 

Many more populist parties take an ambivalent position towards the warmonger Putin. These are primarily parties that previously had a good relationship with Russia and Putin personally. Some of them were even financially supported by him but gradually distanced themselves from Putin due to his aggression war against Ukraine, being a clear infringement of international law. Among these are e.g. the Italian Lega and Forza Italia, the Dutch PVV (Nijhuis et al., 2023), the French RN (Meister, 2023) and the VOX party in Spain (Marcos-Marne 2023). 

Most of these parties agreed that measures to give in are necessary but criticised that the EU sanctions against Russia would do more harm to Europe, or the respective nation-state, than to Russia. On the left, an inconsistent continuum of ambivalent attitudes is emerging within this fraction along ideological and dogmatic lines. The diverse historical roots of left-wing populists in either pacifism, antimilitarism or nostalgia for the Soviet Union have translated into various views on the question of arms supply to Ukraine. Apart from the Dutch SP, parts of the German Linke (before its broke-up in November 2023) as well as the Austrian KPÖ plus, the M5S, Syriza and Podemos have viewed arms deliveries with scepticism or rejection. (Kuhn, 2023; Nadjivan, et al. 2023) A deep intergovernmental discontent regarding the delivery of weapons to Ukraine on 21 July 2022 led to the collapse of the Italian government under Mario Draghi, formed together with M5S and Lega (Henneberger, 2022). 

3.3. The pro-Russian Position 

A particularly pronounced anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian stance is represented by the Bulgarian oppositional Vazrazhdane party. (Nikolov, 2023) All the other populist political players, either in opposition or government, seem to avoid such offensiveness. Among those who are steadfastly sticking to their loyal position to the warmonger Putin are the ruling Hungarian Fidesz, the German AfD, the Spanish VOX and the Austrian FPÖ. This position consists of not openly taking the side of Russia or Putin and thereby acting in an obviously pro-Russian manner, but rather to vehemently reject all sanctions measures against Russia and military aid for Ukraine (OTS, 2023a). These populist forces are trying to avoid the accusation and social ostracism of (explicitly) courting a warmonger and are torpedoing the EU, USA and NATO under the guise of being peacemakers and bridge builders themselves. (OTS, 2023b) Hungary under Orbán still maintains good and economically profitable relations with Russia, and FPÖ politicians have not convincingly distanced themselves from Putin, while Austria still depends on Russian gas (Szelényi, 2023; Lumetsberger, 2023). 

In his protest against the military support to Ukraine, Jean-Luc Mélenchon from La France insoumise even collaborated with the far-right populist Eric Zemmour at a “Meeting for Peace” in March 2022 (Pantel, 2022). In their rhetoric, the left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht, who, after the breakup of Die Linke, formed her new populist party BSW, and the right-wing populist Alice Weidel from AfD appear to even act as Putin’s mouthpieces in Germany (Mayer, 2024). 

Security Threats by Anti-European Infiltration 

Despite political and ideological differences, the war in Ukraine seems to have created a new populist collaborating space, while security and defence issues related to the war in Ukraine are redefining the political spectrum in Europe. Relevant is not only the right- or left-wing orientation but also the pluralist or autocratic approach of a political party and its relation to Putin’s Russia. In that sense, populist Russian-friendly disinformation and fake news are part of the Russian hybrid war against Europe. As such, the Russian regime has for years financially supported anti-European, populist parties to destabilise the European Union internally. Among those are f.i. the AfD, Dutch PVV, Italian parties such as Lega, Forza Italia and M5S, the French RN and Austrian FPÖ (Ivaldi, Zankina, 2023). Two years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s impact on European security and defence issues is getting more public attention. The French president Emmanuel Macron accused Marine le Pen of being on Putin’s payroll (Caulcutt et al., 2022). A spy scandal around the Austrian secret service under the FPÖ ministerial term revealed possibly corrupt relations between some civil servants and the Russian regime (Bell, 2024). Apart from those connections with Russia, there has also been intriguing influence by China as f.i. the case of the AfD EU election candidate Maximilian Krah might show. Before his links to the Chinese secret service were uncovered, MEP Krah attracted attention in the EU parliament for his particularly pro-China position (Geisler, Stark, 2024). The immense danger of corruption the so-called Quatargate of 2022 has shown. Before MEP Eva Kaili was convicted of bribery, she also attracted attention in the EU Parliament through her advocacy in favour of Qatar and Morocco. The sum of 1.5 Million euros in cash that the Belgian police found in her possession is said to have come from both governments. Kaili has since been charged with several offences relating to corruption, expelled from the S&D Group, released from pre-trial detention in shackles and is still active in the EU Parliament as a non-attached MEP (ibid.) Particularly brazen is the fact that, with the help of her lawyers, she presents herself as the victim of a conspiracy and, by that, further polarises the public debate (Wax et al., 2023). 

All those cases have made clear that security threats have reached national and European institutions, which should instead guarantee human rights, checks and balances, and liberal democracy throughout Europe. 

Conclusion, Learnings and Prospects 

Following this fast and inevitably incomplete overview of the role of populist forces in the transformation of the European security context, one question arises: How can populism, as a potential security threat to the EU, be countered without imitating?ⁱⁱⁱ There are two central points: Instead of remaining paralysed by the rule of mostly right-wing populist parties, one should rather be aware of its finitude (Meyer, 2023). Only in 2023 did right-wing populist parties, such as VOX in Spain and PiS in Poland, suffer a setback. Conversely, the cases of Italy, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Netherlands have shown how much disunity and bickering between liberal-democratic and pluralistic parties further accelerate the success of autocratic, anti-democratic populist parties. 

To seriously and sustainably deal with security-threatening populism, which – as some cases show – goes hand in hand with corruption, clear, unambiguous legislation (including the abolition of official secrecy) and consistent implementation is needed (Nadjivan, Sustala, 2023: 34). Stronger sanctions should also be considered at the EU level if democratic principles are undermined or attacked, and European standards are ignored (keyword: expand Article 7 and speed up procedures). 

Russia’s violation of international law by forging a brutal war against Ukraine and a hybrid war against the whole of Europe has pushed the continent into an unprecedented situation since WWII and the Cold War. What is urgently needed is a common foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union in cooperation with its partner states and organisations. A good practice appears to be the current Sky Shield initiative by some European states, including EU, NATO members and even neutral states like Switzerland and Austria.  

Each EU member state must prevent any unwanted influence, attack, or infiltration by third parties. As shown, populists might serve as mouthpieces of third parties, so complete transparency regarding party finance and politicians’ (further) income is the key. Finally, it is high time that the EU in international relations finally speaks with one voice, showing it is not only a generous global payer but also a serious global player.  

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