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Abstract  

In April 2024, the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG), widely known as the ‘Ramstein Coalition’, will celebrate its second year of existence. Firstly, the already operational and future capability coalitions can provide valuable experience and insight into the type and scale of military equipment needed to win modern conventional wars. Secondly, Ukraine’s capability coalitions have laid the groundwork for future defence cooperation in both the EU and NATO. Thirdly, the capability coalitions formed under UDCG, also known as the Ramstein Group, could be of interest to EU Member States in terms of implementing the European Defence Industrial Strategy and developing their defence potential.

In April 2024, the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG), widely known as the ‘Ramstein Coalition’, will celebrate its second year of existence. Since then, it has gone through several stages of development, both in terms of both the number of participating states and the philosophy behind its activities. Within the framework of “Ramstein”, Ukraine has initiated capability coalitions with its partners, focusing not only on the immediate needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield, but also on the long-term perspective of defence planning and the projection of future military capability requirements.  

Given that in 2022 EU Member States and NATO allies appeared unprepared for developments in 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, new sober and comprehensive approaches are essential at the strategic level as well as at the level of technological and military adaptations. From a strategic point of view, Ukraine offers battlefield-tested cases worth reassessing in EU and NATO capitals. 

The already operational and future capability coalitions can provide valuable experience and insight into the type and scale of military equipment needed to win modern conventional wars. Ukraine’s capability coalitions have laid the groundwork for future defence cooperation in both the EU and NATO. 

Coalitions deliver 

Despite the overwhelming courage and high morale shown by the Ukrainian people in defending their land and families, the Western military and financial support for Ukraine has played a critical role in preserving its ability to defend itself and push back against the Russian aggressor. In terms of political and diplomatic support for Ukraine, both the EU and NATO are major international actors.  

The European Union rates as Ukraine’s biggest partner in terms of financial, military, and humanitarian support. But when it comes solely to military support, despite good intentions, both NATO and the EU have become hostage to their decision-making processes. Since 2022, NATO has been providing Ukraine with urgent but non-lethal military support to reinforce the Ukrainian overall posture (NATO, 2024). The European Union has an ever-growing defence and military potential, but some initiatives are bogged down in endless discussions, while others have been blocked by individual EU Member States.  

One of the manifestations of the cumbersome bureaucratic bottlenecks is the current situation with the European Peace Facility (EPF), the EU’s off-budget instrument originally intended for non-lethal military assistance to third countries and support for Common Security and Defence Policy missions. Since February 2022, the EPF has become the main instrument for partially covering the financial expenditures of EU Member States for the supply of military equipment from national stockpiles. From February 2022 to May 2023, the EU approved seven tranches directed to reimburse EU members for military aid to Kyiv. In May 2023, Hungary blocked the eighth tranche of €500 million euros. As of April 2024, the Hungarian veto has not been lifted1. (Yemets & Oliynyk, 2024). 

Against this backdrop, in addition to significant bilateral support from the United States in 2022–2023, Ukraine largely benefited from coalitions of willing partners with capabilities in specific areas of interest. Taking into consideration the complexities and sensitivities of decision-making in the EU and NATO, official Kyiv communicated its military requests via the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), also known as the Ramstein Group. The group was set up in response to Russia’s full-scale aggression. Initially, the US called on its close allies to join the UDCG. 

The first meeting was held in April 2022 with 43 partners. Today, 54 states (including all 32 NATO allies) and representatives of the European Union and NATO are members of this platform. Active members of the UDCG have provided about $88 billion in military assistance to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale aggression (Ukrinform, 2024). 

Previously, many initiatives by partner states to pool their resources and supply a particular type of military equipment were called coalitions. Coalitions of tanks, armour, or artillery entered the popular vocabulary in 2022. At the time, however, these initiatives were not comprehensively coordinated. Rather, participating nations looked at their military stocks and offered up available military equipment and ammunition.

In order to better streamline and complement the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces according to the national defence potential of the partners, separate coalitions emerged under the umbrella of the Ramstein Group in 2023.  

Thus, in February 2023, the Leopard Tank Coalition was announced at the UDCG meeting, uniting the partners in a joint search for a specific type of ground combat platform. At the tenth meeting of the ‘Ramstein format’, nine partners committed themselves to deliver around 150 Leopard tanks to Ukraine (Suspilne, 2023). Another successful attempt has been made in the area of air support for Ukraine. Since the beginning of 2023, Ukrainian officials have been very vocal about the need for a fighter coalition. In July 2023, the F-16 Coalition was formed to streamline partners’ efforts to train Ukrainian pilots and maintenance groups. In Vilnius, 11 states signed the memorandum, which outlines the training process for pilots, technicians, and support staff, as well as fully operational F-16 capabilities (Armyinform, 2023a). 

Ramstein 2.0 and the Future Force Concept  

Since autumn 2023, Ukraine has rearticulated its interests and expectations from military cooperation with partners within the framework of the UDCG. Previously, Ukraine focused on filling urgent gaps in military equipment and ammunition. From September 2023, Ukraine and its partners have also focused on a more concerted and long-term approach. This format is called ‘Ramstein 2.0’ (Armyinform, 2023b). 

This format is in line with the Future Force Concept presented by the Head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD), R. Umerov, during the International Defence Industry Forum in Ukraine. The core idea is to propose a vision of a new model of armed forces and defence sector in Ukraine after a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities in Ukraine, consultations with all branches of the armed forces, along with security guarantees, NATO standards, and so forth (Ukrinform, 2023).  

The Future Force Concept has continued to evolve through the capability coalitions that operate under the UDCG framework. Some of the coalitions, launched in early 2023, have been complemented with long-term plans and visions, as well as the engagement of new members. New cooperation frameworks for the development of a common capability aim to cooperate in the areas of procurement, acquisition, and maintenance of specific military equipment and ammunition. Such an approach also offers additional benefits to participating nations in the form of reduced common costs and increased interoperability.   

The Ramstein format currently has 30 nations participating in at least one capability coalition. In each coalition, there are two or sometimes three lead partner nations that steer efforts within the group to build one of the capability areas of the Ukrainian force (US Department of Defense, 2024). At the end of 2023, there were five capability coalitions: Air Force, Air Defence, Armaments, Information Technologies, and Maritime Security. In 2024, the capability coalitions received a new boost. In January, the Artillery Coalition was officially launched in Paris, with France and the US co-chairing the group. In February, the Drone Coalition was officially launched during the 19th UDCG meeting. The coalitions are gaining new members in a very dynamic way.  In March, Germany and Poland announced their intention to activate the Armour Coalition, and Sweden, Italy, and the United Kingdom announced their intention to join (Kravchenko, 2024). 

As of April 2024 there are eight collective arrangements between partners (see Table 1). 

Table 1. Capability coalitions  

Thematic orientation  Lead partners  
Air Force capability US, Denmark, and the Netherlands 
Armour capability Poland, Germany, and Italy 
Artillery capability France and the United States 
De-mining coalition Lithuania and Iceland 
IT coalition Estonia and Luxembourg 
Drone capability Latvia and the United Kingdom 
Integrated Air and Missile Defence capabilities Germany and France 
Maritime Security coalition United Kingdom and Norway 

Each coalition is different in terms of its thematic focus, the number of willing members, and the leading nations. The leading states are responsible for steering the activities of the group and the involvement of new participants. They are also the first to react if the security situation for Ukraine in their area of responsibility deteriorates. Many have noted that following Russia’s intensified missile attacks on Ukrainian cities in March and April, Germany, as co-leader of the Integrated Air and Missile Defence capabilities coalition, committed itself to seeking additional batteries of the Patriot air defence system not only among NATO allies but also in third countries (Militarnyi, 2024).  

Coalition initiation does not require the agreement of all UDCG members, and it can take weeks or months to launch a new collective initiative in response to urgent needs expressed by Ukrainian counterparts. For example, an ad hoc coalition has been formed to secure financial support for the Czech-led initiative to purchase 155mm and Soviet-era ammunition for Ukraine from third parties. The Czech government is acting as an intermediary for Ukrainian partners willing to contribute to the purchase of 155mm ammunition. The initiative has already pooled financial resources from 18 countries (Interfax, 2024). 

During the UDCG meetings, the partners also discuss practical arrangements and the potential for creating additional capability coalitions. These could complement the existing ones and also contribute to the design of the Future Force Concept. Partners have already expressed a proposal to launch a joint effort on long-range capabilities. A coalition on logistics and military mobility has also been discussed.  

Lessons to share with the EU and Western partners 

In early March 2024, the European Commission presented its long-awaited European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS). This document, once formally adopted, could complete the circle of strategic documents shaping the EU’s defence and security landscape after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. A groundbreaking innovation of the EDIS is the invitation to Ukraine to participate in European defence programmes and initiatives on an equal footing with EU Member States and Norway. This was not the case before, despite Ukraine’s interest. It is now self-evident that Ukrainian experience in fighting an enemy that is superior in manpower and materiel is of key importance to European partners in developing and scaling up future defence capabilities.  

It is a positive development that the European Commission (EC) has consulted with relevant Ukrainian public bodies in the preparation of the document. Additionally, as part of the acknowledgement of the crucial importance of mil-tech development in Ukraine, the EC is set to launch an Office for Defence Innovation in Kyiv (European Commission, 2024).  

The capability coalitions formed under the UDCG could be of interest to EU Member States in terms of implementing the EDIS and developing their defence potential. The way in which capability conditions are structured and managed offers tangible opportunities for long-term cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. 

  • Firstly, coalitions of five to 20 members appear to be more manageable in terms of process and a result-oriented approach than the Union-wide initiatives.  
  • Secondly, provided that Ukraine is considered a full partner under the current version of the EDIS, a predominant number of these coalitions can serve as a framework for new projects within existing and planned European defence programmes (EDIP, revised PESCO, EDF), proposing viable solutions for enhanced EU defence readiness.  
  • Thirdly, several of these eight coalitions reflect the EU Capability Development Priorities (CDP), updated by the European Defence Agency in 2023, in terms of thematic areas and combat-proven mil-tech innovations. Their effective activity in Ukraine will create the preconditions for well-considered approaches to EU Member States’ defence capabilities, as well as joint initiatives under the Strategic Compass.

Conclusions and further developments  

Capability coalitions represent a very efficient and promising format of collective military cooperation, where partners look for ways to increase Kyiv’s efficiency on the battlefield and cut common costs.

These multilateral arrangements make it possible to avoid the lengthy bureaucratic procedures of international organisations and at the same time focus on areas where the participating states have sufficient capabilities, relevant defence industrial bases or technologies, and financial resources.   

Further developments can be observed in several directions. As noted above, the number of capability coalitions may increase and include other priority areas for capability development in Ukraine. At the same time, the number of participants in existing coalitions will increase, reflecting further allies’ interest in keeping pace with evolving military technologies and teaming up with like-minded international partners. 

Of course, when many nations are involved in the process, some inconsistencies may arise. To address the current shortcomings in 2024, further steps have been taken to deepen the coordination and interaction of capability coalitions. Over time, the level of coordination of capability coalitions will be increased to seek natural synergies in the supply of weapons, ammunition, and equipment to Ukraine. 

Ukraine continuously invites partners to join those capability coalitions that reflect their military potential and strategic interests. Broader collective arrangements will benefit from joint defence investments, procurement, and adaptation of defence industry capacities to long-term defence planning.  

At this stage, despite the huge amount of military assistance channelled through the “Ramstein format”, Ukraine is not in a position to survive the war of attrition, let alone resume offensive operations. The modern, flexible format of cooperation must be backed up with the appropriate level of military and financial support.  


References 

Citation
How to Bridge the EU’s and Ukraine’s Defence Industries: Mechanisms and Directions
Hennadiy Maksak

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