Op-ed / Make Russia Pay: How the Frozen Russian Assets Will Help Bring Victory over the Aggressor Closer
War is very expensive. A prolonged war against an aggressor who outnumbers you in terms of resources and people is even more expensive. This is well known not only by Ukrainians but also by our partners. Since 24 February 2022, when the Russian Federation began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to ISW (2024), our state has received €138 billion from our partners.
At the same time, the preliminary amount of damages that Russia should cover, announced by the leaders of the G7 countries, reaches US$486 billion (G7, 2024). However, to receive these funds from the aggressor, we must first win the war. And while we are bringing this victory closer, the losses from missile attacks and hostilities will only increase, and more and more money will be needed from our partners for defence expenses.
Financing of armed aid for Ukraine
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian people and the Defence Forces have shown unprecedented heroism. However, let’s be realistic – people’s heroism alone cannot protect us from aggression or liberate our lands. Weapons and technologies are needed. Lots of weapons. Where will the West get the funds for this?
The security agreement that Ukraine signed with the EU provides €50 billion in support, which is included in the budget of the European Union for the next four years within the framework of the Ukraine Facility programme (President of Ukraine, 2024).1 These funds have already started coming to Ukraine and are critically important for us (Kutielieva & Pohorilov, 2024). After all, the existing challenges related to the war have not gone away, but new ones, as a result of Russian missile attacks on the energy infrastructure of Ukraine, have been added (Zmina, 2024).
In addition, the number of NATO member countries that will set the level of their defence expenditures at 2 per cent of GDP is increasing. The number of such countries has reached 11, but according to Jens Stoltenberg, this number will increase (Tidey, 2023).
Moreover, thanks to the agreement of the G7 countries, Ukraine will receive a loan of US$50 billion, which will be repaid at the expense of profits from the frozen Russian assets (Lukiv & Mackenzie, 2024). And Belgium has agreed to the transfer of income from such assets to Ukraine through a special fund (Schickler, 2024). Our partners have no reservations regarding the use of these funds, and therefore Kyiv will be able to spend the money it receives on its defence and weapons.
Who should really pay?
Russia is deliberately waging a war of attrition and is simply waiting for the world to tire of it or for aid to Ukraine to become too expensive for its partners. The aggressor plays on this in its hybrid information operations.
It is also really difficult for Western politicians to explain to their voters why their countries have had to allocate considerable funds for the defence of Ukraine for almost two and a half years. Populists often speculate negatively on these questions, and in some places, they are successful (Chidi, 2024).
However, there is an answer to the question of who should pay both for Ukraine’s recovery and for its current defence needs. It must be the aggressor, that is, the Russian Federation. The world has frozen Russian assets and they must be handed over to the victim of its aggression.
We already have a precedent for using the profits from frozen Russian assets, but the assets themselves are hundreds of times more. The amount of only those that are publicly known reaches approximately US$500 billion, that is, almost three times more than the aid that Ukraine has received from the collective West.
Win–win solution
Russia understands only strong and decisive actions; it perceives mild pressure as weakness. The sanctions imposed on the Kremlin work slowly and allow the aggressor to adapt to new realities: to look for new markets and export and import bypasses (in some places even frankly criminal ones).
Using Russian assets for the defence of Ukraine will put the aggressor in its place and send a clear signal to other non-democratic regimes about the consequences of their aggressive actions towards their smaller neighbours.
This will save the money of Western taxpayers and, therefore, undercut the arguments of populists who actively manipulate the topic of money for Ukraine.
Therefore, the special funds from which aid to Ukraine comes should be filled primarily with frozen Russian money. And these must be sovereign assets. The aggressor must understand that democracies have teeth and are capable of biting.
References
- Chidi, G. (2024). ‘Biden Struggles to Land Lines as Trump Lies in First Presidential Debate’. The Guardian, 28 June. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/jun/27/biden-trump-presidential-debate-atlanta.
- G7 (2024). ‘Apulia G7 Leaders’ Communiqué’. https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf.
- ISW (Institute for the Study of War) (2024). ‘Fact Sheet: US Assistance to Ukraine’. 8 February. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-us-assistance-ukraine.
- Kutielieva, I., & Pohorilov, S. (2024). ‘EU Allocates €1.9bn of Financial Support to Ukraine’. Ukrainska Pravda, 27 June. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/06/27/7462879/.
- Lukiv, J., & Mackenzie, J. (2024). ‘G7 Agrees $50bn Loan for Ukraine from Russian Assets’. BBC News, 13 June. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cllldqyg19ro.
- President of Ukraine (2024). ‘Joint Security Commitments between Ukraine and the European Union’. 27 June. https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilni-bezpekovi-zobovyazannya-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-yevropejsk-91801.
- Schickler, J. (2024). ‘Russian Assets to Aid Ukraine’. Euronews, 8 May. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/05/08/brussels-agrees-to-send-3-bn-from-frozen-russian-assets-to-aid-ukraine.
- Tidey, A. (2023). ‘Number of NATO Allies Spending 2% of GDP on Defence to Jump This Year’. Euronews, 7 July. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/07/07/number-of-nato-allies-spending-2-of-gdp-on-defence-to-jump-this-year.
- Zmina (2024). ‘Russians Significantly Damaged Ukraine’s Largest Dam, the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant, in Mass Missile Attack (Updated)’. 23 March. https://zmina.info/en/news-en/russians-significantly-damaged-ukraines-largest-dam-the-dnipro-hydroelectric-power-plant-in-mass-missile-attack/.
