Reinvent Yourself! 75 Years of NATO’s Strategic Evolution

Introduction

NATO often claims to be the most successful alliance in history. Whether this is so or not is for historians to assess. But undoubtedly, NATO is the most adaptable alliance in history. After 75 years in existence, 2024 is a good occasion to review how NATO has reinvented itself over these decades. 

NATO is often misleadingly labelled a military organisation and thus is typically associated with military might and, in the words of Joseph Nye, hard power. However, NATO is first and foremost a political-military organisation, with the primacy of politics at its core – and military strength as a means to an end, not an end it itself. Therefore, soft power and the ability to attract, co-opt, and persuade are key features of the organisation.  

If you join me in a short journey through 75 years of NATO history, I will show you that over the more than seven decades of its existence, NATO has evolved through a series of combinations of soft and hard power components. 

According to a famous quote from NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, NATO was created to ‘keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’. 

NATO’s founding act as enshrined in the 1949 North Atlantic (or Washington) Treaty states in the Preamble that Alliance members are ‘determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area.’  

And in Article 2 the NATO nations commit ‘to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions for stability and well-being’. 

Therefore, while from the outset NATO’s essential and enduring purpose has been and is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members – in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter – this also meant, right from the start, doing so by political and military means – and by putting ‘security’ into a broader context of political, economic, and social systems, culture, and values. 

NATO’s activities have evolved over time, but it is important to stress that while the strategic environment changes, the basic tenets of cooperation within the Alliance remain true to the principles of the Washington Treaty: NATO is a politically led organisation of sovereign nations, striving jointly for collective deterrence and defence and for the peaceful resolution of disputes. It is, by definition, defensive in nature. These elements still characterise the organisation today. 

The nature of hard and soft power in NATO has changed significantly over time, and their relative weight has evolved and fluctuated within a changing strategic international environment. 

Since the birth of NATO, there have been four distinct periods during which its strategic thinking – and its use of soft and hard power – have evolved:  

• the Cold War period;  

• the immediate post-Cold War period; 

• the security environment since 9/11, that is, the al-Qaida terrorist attack against the United States in 2001; and 

• the period since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. 

From 1949 to the end of the Cold War 

From 1949 to 1991, international relations were dominated by bipolar confrontation between East and West. The emphasis was more on mutual tension and confrontation than on dialogue and cooperation. This led to an often dangerous and expensive arms race.  

While the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty had created the Allies, it had not created a military structure that could effectively coordinate their actions. This changed when growing worries about Soviet intentions culminated in the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.  

The effect upon the Alliance was dramatic. NATO soon gained a consolidated command structure with a military headquarters based in the Parisian suburb of Rocquencourt, near Versailles. This was Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE, with US General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR. Soon afterwards, the Allies established a permanent civilian secretariat in Paris and named NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay of the United Kingdom. 

In these early days, NATO’s key objective was to ‘convince the USSR that war does not pay, and should war occur, to ensure a successful defence’.¹ This strong reliance on hard power components as means to achieve political and military goals was further accentuated in the 1950s following the invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces and the ensuing Korean War.  

During this period, NATO adopted the strategic doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’.² This meant, in a nutshell, that if the Soviet Union attacked, NATO would respond with nuclear weapons. The intended effect of this doctrine was to deter either side from risk-taking since any attack, however small, could have led to a full nuclear exchange. At the same time, ‘massive retaliation’ allowed Alliance members to focus their energies on economic growth rather than on maintaining large conventional armies.  

While this clearly demonstrates a heavy reliance on hard power in its most extreme form, it also proves that hard (and by default soft) power is not good or bad per se, nor is hard power by definition less ethical or human than soft power.  

The case can be made that NATO’s hard military and strategic stance during this period ensured peace, security, and hence also, stability and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area. In other words, it is the ‘hard power components’ which are there to protect elements typically associated with soft power: freedom, democracy, human rights, and prosperity. 

This period also illustrates that even during the ‘peak times’ of the Cold War, NATO always developed its ‘hard power’ in tandem with its ‘soft power’ dimensions. 

Since the Alliance’s founding, the smaller Allies in particular had argued for greater non-military cooperation. The Suez Crisis in autumn 1956 then laid bare the lack of political consultation that divided some members. In addition, the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1956 shocked the Allies into greater scientific cooperation. A report delivered to the North Atlantic Council by the foreign ministers of Norway, Italy, and Canada – the ‘Three Wise Men’ – recommended more robust political consultation and cooperation in the areas of science, culture, and the information field. The report’s conclusions led, inter alia, to the establishment of the NATO Science Programme. 

The report reinforced NATO’s political and non-military role and contributed to broadening the strategic framework of the Alliance. Many of the recommendations that were approved by NATO then remain as relevant as ever today: 

A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realization of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought.³ 

Massive retaliation called into question 

In the 1960s, this uneasy but stable status quo began to change. The ‘massive retaliation’ strategy relied heavily on the United States’ nuclear capability and its will to defend European territory in the case of a Soviet nuclear attack. But Europeans started to doubt whether a US president would sacrifice an American city for a European city. In parallel, the USSR had developed its nuclear capability. As the USSR’s nuclear potential increased, NATO’s competitive advantage in nuclear deterrence diminished.  

The outbreak of the second Berlin crisis (1958–1962), provoked by the Soviet Union, reinforced these doubts: how should NATO react to threats that were below the level of an all-out attack? NATO’s nuclear deterrent had not stopped the Soviets from threatening the position of Western Allies in Berlin. So, what should be done? 

In 1961, J.F. Kennedy arrived in the White House. He was concerned about the issue of limited warfare and the notion that a nuclear exchange could be started by accident or miscalculation. In the meantime, the Berlin crisis intensified, leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and in October 1962, the Cold War peaked with the Cuban Missile Crisis.  

The United States started advocating a stronger non-nuclear posture for NATO and the need for a strategy of ‘flexible response’. This eventually led in 1967/1968 to NATO adopting its new doctrine of ‘flexible response’.⁴  

There were two key features to the new strategy: flexibility and escalation: 

The deterrent concept of the Alliance is based on flexibility that will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s specific response to aggression and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack.⁵ 

This evolution brings home another more generic observation: hard power is not static per se. If used in the context of a ‘learning organisation’, it changes and evolves with the changing strategic environment and is inherently capable of reforming itself.  

While the ‘Report of the Three Wise Men’ diversified and reinforced the various forms of cooperation throughout the NATO structure, the next milestone in the genesis of ‘hard and soft power’ in NATO came with the so-called Harmel Report. This report, delivered by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, was adopted in 1967, with the experience and lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Berlin crisis still fresh in everyone’s minds. In essence, it recommended that NATO should have a new political pillar promoting dialogue and détente between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.  

Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.⁶ 

The report helped lay the foundation for the convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1973. Two years later, the conference led to the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act. The Act bound its signatories – including the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact – to respect the fundamental freedom of their citizens, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief.  

The Harmel Report illustrates that hard power can mutate into forms of soft power, and it clearly marks the reinforcement of ‘soft power’ approaches within NATO. 

Towards the end of the Cold War 

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet deployment of SS-20 Saber ballistic missiles in Europe led to the suspension of détente. To counter the Soviet deployment, the Allies made the ‘dual track’ decision to deploy nuclear-capable Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe while continuing negotiations with the Soviets.  

The deployment was not scheduled to begin until 1983. In the meantime, the Allies hoped to achieve an arms control agreement that would eliminate the need for the weapons. Lacking the hoped-for agreement with the Soviets, NATO members suffered internal discord when deployment began in 1983.  

Following the ascent of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet Premier in 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, eliminating all nuclear and ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges. This is now regarded as an initial indication that the Cold War was coming to an end.  

By the mid-1980s, most international observers believed that Soviet Communism had lost the intellectual battle with the West. Dissidents had dismantled the ideological supports of Communist regimes. In the late 1980s, the communist government of Poland found itself forced to negotiate with the formerly repressed independent trade union ‘Solidarity’ and its leader, Lech Wałęsa. Soon other democratic activists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself would begin to demand those very same rights. 

By this time, command economies in the Warsaw Pact were disintegrating. The Soviet Union was spending three times as much as the United States on defence with an economy that was one-third the size. Mikhail Gorbachev came to power with the intention of fundamentally reforming the communist system.  

When the East German regime began to collapse in 1989, the Soviet Union did not intervene, reversing the Brezhnev Doctrine. This time, the Soviets chose long-term reform over short-term control that was increasingly beyond their capabilities, setting in motion a train of events that led to the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. 

The immediate post-Cold War period 

In 1991, a new era commenced. The formidable enemy that the Soviet Union had once been was dissolved. Russia, together with other former adversaries, became NATO partners and, in some cases, NATO members. For the Alliance, the period was characterised by dialogue and cooperation, as well as other new ways of contributing to peace and stability such as multinational crisis management operations.  

As enshrined in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts,⁷ the Alliance maintained the security of its members as NATO’s fundamental purpose,⁸ but this was combined with two new dimensions. 

Partnerships 

From 1991 onwards, NATO was to be the foundation stone for a larger, pan-European security architecture. By establishing wide-ranging partnerships, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance aimed to increase transparency, mutual confidence, and eventually the capacity for joint action. This cooperation also invited and attracted former adversaries – a significant new soft power dimension for NATO. 

The Yugoslav conflict – and other contemporaneous conflicts in the Caucasus and elsewhere – made clear that the post-Cold War power vacuum was a source of dangerous instability. Mechanisms for partnership had to be strengthened in a way that would allow non-NATO countries to cooperate with the Alliance to reform still-evolving democratic and military institutions and to relieve their strategic isolation.  

As part of this evolving effort, the Allies created the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. The Partnership for Peace allowed non-NATO countries, or ‘partners’, to share information with NATO Allies and to modernise their militaries in line with modern democratic standards. Partners were encouraged to choose their own level of involvement with the Alliance. The path to full membership would remain open to those who decided to pursue it. 

This process reached an important milestone at the 1999 Washington Summit when three former partners – Czechia, Hungary, and Poland – took their seats as full Alliance members following their completion of a political and military reform programme.  

Through enlargement, NATO had played a crucial role in consolidating democracy and stability in Europe.  

Over the decades, these partnerships were deepened and widened to include countries from the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East as well as some partners in Africa, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific. 

Crisis management 

From the early 1990s, NATO’s strategy also envisaged standing ready – case by case, by consensus, and in conformity with Article 7 of the NATO Treaty – to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management and crisis response operations. This was the birth of an ever-growing range of NATO operations and missions. These operations represent the concrete application of a soft and hard power mix, or smart power, to use the term coined by Joseph Nye. 

The collapse of Communism had given way to the rise of nationalism and ethnic violence, particularly in the Western Balkans. At first, the Allies hesitated to intervene in what was perceived as a civil war. Later, the conflict around Bosnia-Herzegovina came to be seen as a war of aggression and ethnic cleansing, and the Alliance decided to act.  

Initially, NATO offered its full support to United Nations efforts to end war crimes, including direct military action in the form of a naval embargo. Soon the enforcement of a no-fly zone led to airstrikes against heavy weapons violating UN resolutions.  

Finally, the Alliance carried out a nine-day air campaign in September 1995 that played a major role in ending the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. In December of that year, NATO deployed a UN-mandated multinational force of 60,000 soldiers to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and to create the conditions for a self-sustaining peace. 

Even before the new Allies joined NATO 1999 in Washington, however, a new crisis had already broken out. 

By the end of 1998, over 300,000 Kosovar Albanians had fled their homes amid conflict between Albanian separatists in Kosovo and the Serbian military and police. Following the failure of intense international efforts to resolve the crisis, the Alliance conducted airstrikes for 78 days and flew 38,000 sorties. The goal was to allow a multinational peacekeeping force to enter Kosovo and put an end to ethnic cleansing in the region.  

On 4 June 1999, NATO suspended its air campaign after confirming that a withdrawal of the Serbian army from Kosovo had begun, and the deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) followed shortly thereafter. Today, KFOR troops are still deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. 

In the case of both Bosnia and Kosovo, the debate over whether NATO was to enforce a European peace was moot: events had forced the Alliance’s hand.  

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO had been a static organisation whose mere existence was enough to deter the Soviet Union. With the Balkan interventions, the Alliance began to transform into a more dynamic and responsive organisation, ready to act, if necessary, beyond its traditional North Atlantic area.  

In other words, during the entire Cold War period, NATO did not fire a single shot. Hard power was used as a policy and a military posture.  

Since the end of the Cold War, and with growing engagements in operations and missions, NATO de facto has used hard power tools as an instrument – while at the same time the relevance of soft power has increased – be it as an essential component of crisis management or by activating NATO’s soft power dimension via the constant growth of partnerships.  

The security environment since 9/11 

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon demonstrated to the Allies that political disorder in distant parts of the globe could have terrible consequences at home. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5).  

Substate actors – in this case, the al-Qaida terrorist group – had used Afghanistan as a base to export instability to the industrialised world, using hijacked airliners as improvised weapons of mass destruction to kill thousands of civilians.  

Subsequent attacks, including the Istanbul bombings in November 2003, the attack on the Madrid commuter train system on 11 March 2004, and one on the public transport system in London on 7 July 2005, made clear that violent extremists were determined to target civilian populations. NATO needed to protect its populations both at home and abroad.  

In autumn 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a coalition of countries – including many NATO Allies – intervened militarily in Afghanistan. The goal of the mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, was to deny al-Qaida a base of operations and to detain as many al-Qaida leaders as possible.  

In December 2001, following the overthrow of the Taliban regime, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 authorised the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a multilateral force in and around Kabul, to help stabilise the country and create the conditions for a self-sustaining peace. In August 2003, NATO took over command and coordination of ISAF. 

Over nearly twenty years this was to become the single most important crisis management operation. It ended dramatically in August 2021 with the withdrawal of international troops, the collapse of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and the return to power of the Taliban. 

Overall, NATO also proceeded to deepen and extend its partnerships and, essentially, accelerate its transformation to develop new political relationships and stronger operational capabilities to respond to an increasingly global and more challenging world. 

These radical changes need to be reflected in NATO’s strategic thinking. 

International security developments have an increasing impact on the lives of the citizens of Allied and other countries. Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. Instability due to failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and their causes and effects, the growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies, and the disruption of the flow of vital resources are likely to be the main risks or challenges for the Alliance in that period.⁹ 

These developments led in 2010 to the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’. At the time, the Allies stated with confidence:  

Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.¹⁰ 

The Strategic Concept defined three core tasks for NATO – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – and it identified threats such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, terrorism, and cyber attacks as fundamental threats to Euro-Atlantic security. 

The main characteristics of NATO in this period are twofold: 

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• The Alliance said good-bye to the conception of a ‘Euro-centric’ Alliance and moved to become not a ‘global’ actor, but an actor in international global security matters. 

• NATO moved from an Alliance with a nearly exclusive focus on territorial defence to an organisation with a strong if not dominant focus on crisis management and transnational security.  

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The latest rebalancing act – refocusing on hard power  

In Afghanistan, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Allies have seen that military power (hard power) can contribute to resolving conflicts or ending wars, but it is not enough to ensure peace and stability.  

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its unjustified and unprovoked attack on Ukraine are a sobering reminder of the importance of NATO’s key purpose: to ensure the collective defence and security of all the Allies. 

In fact, triggered by Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO commenced the largest reinforcement of our collective defence in a generation.  

Since 2022, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered the peace and gravely altered our security environment. In contrast to past decades, security can no longer be taken for granted.  

These radical changes in the security environment led in 2022 to the adoption of NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept. It gives a sobering assessment of the deterioration of the security environment: 

The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected.¹¹ 

As a consequence, we need to invest more in defence and overcome decades of atrophy in our defence forces. Interestingly, 77 per cent of the population in NATO nations agree on the need to maintain or increase defence spending. NATO’s cooperation with the EU is more vital than ever. We need to stand together in an age of global competition.  

At the Vilnius Summit in 2023, NATO leaders took further major steps to strengthen our deterrence and defence for the long term, across all domains and against all threats and challenges. NATO agreed the most comprehensive defence plans since the end of the Cold War, designed to counter the two main threats to the Alliance: Russia and terrorism. To execute the plans, NATO is putting 300,000 troops on higher readiness, backed by substantial air and naval power. We are also increasing our stockpiles of munitions and equipment, using our long-standing NATO Defence Planning Process to provide industry with the long-term demand signal needed to boost production. In Vilnius, NATO leaders endorsed a new Defence Production Action Plan to aggregate demand, boost capacity, and increase interoperability. 

Most importantly, NATO shifted from using armed forces in crisis management abroad to deterrence and defence at home. All this sends a strong message to Russia that we will protect and defend every inch of Allied territory. At the same time, we shifted from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial.  

This strong defence posture also enables NATO’s Allies to provide an unprecedented level of support to Ukraine. This includes air defences, tanks, artillery, and training for Ukrainian soldiers. These contributions will help Ukrainians defend their country and retake occupied territory. 

At the Washington Summit in July 2024, commemorating 75 years of NATO, we will take further steps to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence, resource our defence plans, bolster our support to Ukraine, and deepen our partnerships around the world. We are stronger and safer when we stand with like-minded partners to protect the rules-based international order.  

Conclusions 

Since its founding in 1949, the transatlantic Alliance’s flexibility, embedded in its original Treaty, has allowed it to suit the different requirements of different times.  

In the 1950s, the Alliance was a purely defensive organisation.  

In the 1960s, NATO became a political instrument for détente.  

In the 1990s, the Alliance was a tool for the stabilisation of Eastern Europe and Central Asia through the incorporation of new partners and Allies.  

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the centre of gravity of the Alliance and its partners revolved around crisis management. 

Since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine began in 2022, NATO’s focus has again shifted towards collective deterrence and defence. 

Overall, NATO’s evolution reinforces a number of conclusions: 

Throughout its existence, the Alliance has evolved through a series of combinations of soft and hard power components. 

Hard and soft power are not opposing poles but rather complementary components, a productive symbiosis ultimately used for the overall mission of the Alliance: peace and security. 

The relative weight of hard power has diminished since the end of the Cold War, giving soft power components a stronger lead. 

Since 2022 and the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, NATO’s focus has again shifted towards its hard power dimension.  

In the first half of the twenty-first century, NATO faces an ever-growing number of new threats. As the foundation stone of transatlantic peace and freedom, NATO must be ready to meet these challenges. 

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N.B. The views expressed in this op-ed are the author’s own and should not be taken to reflect necessarily those of NATO or NATO Allies.