Security in Peril: Disinformation Challenges to Democratic Stability in the Western Balkans and Kosovo 

Abstract

In recent years, a concerning trend has emerged across the Western Balkans: a decline in citizens’ valuation of democracy. Despite strong majorities expressing a preference for democracy, growing scepticism about its actual effectiveness is pervasive. This article delves into the factors contributing to this growing threat to democracy, such as the erosion of confidence in government institutions and the prioritisation of quality of life over democratic standards, especially among the youth.  Together with the exacerbating influences on these trends of foreign powers such as Russia and China, persistent unresolved ethnic tensions, and political instability, these dynamics directly impact regional security and, ultimately, the defence of Europe. 

The article examines a concerning shift in the perception of democracy within the region which has resulted in rising support for strong leaders and the decline of democratic values. External actors, particularly Russia and China, play a significant role in shaping internal factors through aggressive disinformation campaigns, fostering geopolitical alternatives, and challenging democratic ideals. These campaigns manipulate public opinion, escalate ethnic tensions, and erode trust in democratic processes. Addressing these multifaceted threats necessitates a comprehensive strategy encompassing media literacy initiatives, robust regulatory and self-regulatory frameworks, and strengthened international cooperation. Recognising these challenges as direct threats to European security – and boldly confronting them – is an urgent priority. Kosovo is taken as a case study since it stands at a crossroads where competing narratives collide, epitomising a profound clash between pro-democracy, pro-Western values and the pro-Russian sentiments fostered by Serbia’s state-controlled media, particularly influential among Kosovo Serbs. 

Introduction 

The Western Balkans region, marked by historical complexities, ethnic diversity, and post-conflict transitions, is grappling with growing challenges to democratic institutions. Threats to democracy, such as disinformation campaigns, ethnic tensions, and political instability, have direct implications for not only for regional security but also for that of all of Europe. Recognising this link is crucial for developing sustainable solutions. 

To effectively address the security threats emanating from these challenges, it is imperative to adopt a comprehensive approach that acknowledges the interconnected nature of security and democratic governance. PolicymakersPolicy-makers must also recognizerecognise that the security of the Western Balkans is intricately linked to EuropeanEurope’s security and its democratic values.  

An effective response must tackle three key growing threats. Disinformation campaigns, fuelled by external actors and internal divisions, pose a significant threat to the democratic fabric of the Western Balkans. These campaigns manipulate public opinion, exacerbate ethnic tensions, and undermine trust in democratic processes. As disinformation often targets vulnerable fault lines within societies, countering these threats necessitates a multifaceted strategy that encompasses media literacy, self-regulatory frameworks, and international cooperation. 

Moreover, growing ethnic tensions in the region continue to test the resilience of democratic institutions and to offer an entry point for exploitation by external actors. Historical grievances and unresolved conflicts contribute to an environment where democratic principles are undermined through exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Advancing the region’s security requires not only fostering inclusivity but also implementing policies that mitigate ethnic divisions, ensuring a more stable and secure environment. 

Political instability further compounds the security challenges facing the Western Balkans. Weak institutions, corruption, and a lack of transparency hinder the consolidation of democracy. A comprehensive approach demands reforms that strengthen the rule of law, enhance accountability and transparency, and promote effective governance, thereby fostering a stable political environment conducive to regional security. The Kosovo case represents a crossroads where competing narratives collide. On one side, there is a fervent push for sovereignty, human rights, and alignment with Western ideals, while on the other, a narrative emphasising historical ties and cultural affinities with Serbia fuels resistance to Western influence, advocating for closer ties with Russia. This complex dynamic reflects not only geopolitical tensions but also deeper socio-political complexities within Kosovo, with implications for the entire Western Balkans. 

Perceptions of democracy: A dangerous retreat  

Despite the optimism that democracy would thrive in the newly independent states emerging from the collapse of the Yugoslav Republic in the 1990s, the Western Balkans region has faced significant challenges to democracy in recent years (NDI, 2022c). Strongmen in the region have gained increasing support, while democratic values have seen a decline. ​​This shift can be attributed to economic insecurity and the failure of democracy to deliver. Weak institutions and corrupt governance practices that preserve executive dominance, patronage, and informality have contributed to the decline of democracy in countries including Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania (Kapidžić, 2020). Key factors contributing to the challenges facing democracy in the Western Balkans include the ​​prevalence of corruption, ethnic tensions, and disinformation efforts, which are successfully exploiting divisions within these countries, further complicating efforts to strengthen democratic values. 

Although there has been notable progress since the 1990s in consolidating democracy across the six countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia – this progress is being undermined by several negative factors. ​​The stalled EU and NATO expansion processes undermined European foreign policy in the region, while stagnant economies throughout the region and pervasive corruption are contributing to democratic backsliding and allowing Russia and China to gain influence.ⁱ Threats to democracy are escalating, with autocracy and nationalism on the rise, supported by Russia and China. Increasing emigration by the youth across the region serves as a poignant indicator of people rejecting corruption, conflict, and the lack of discernible progress. 

The failure to integrate the Western Balkans into Europe is made even more damaging by the inability to resolve long-festering conflicts left over from the collapse of the Yugoslav Republic over a generation ago. The spectre of violence is real in Bosnia, fuelled by the Bosnian Serb leadership’s pursuit of secessionist policies with the open support of Serbia and Russia (RFE/RL, 2022). North Macedonia, pressured with name and constitutional changes and painful concessions, faces frustration among the population with the slow EU integration process and increasing belief that the EU has never genuinely prioritised the Balkans and has shown little interest in including North Macedonia (Vangelov, 2023). Serbia’s departure from pluralism and democratic principles fuels instability, with elections in December 2023 marred by irregularities, the targeting of civil society with smear campaigns, and a system of undermining independent media (Freedom House, 2023b). The failure to conclude the Kosovo–Serbia Dialogue and stalled EU membership negotiations have created vulnerabilities, allowing for increased Russian involvement and regional instability. Alarmingly, Kosovo citizens, especially the youth, are losing faith in democracy, which is especially troubling given the historically strong pro-Western views of the population. The failure to reach an agreement in the stalled 13-year-old EU-mediated Dialogue undermines Kosovo’s hopes for economic growth and democratic and social development (Freedom House, 2023a).  

Prior to 2022, the initiation of EU accession negotiations with Western Balkan countries faced impediments due to concerns over the EU’s capacity to absorb new members and issues related to the rule of law and corruption in potential candidate states. However, the landscape shifted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, prompting Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to swiftly apply for EU membership. In response, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022 and accelerated the enlargement process for the Western Balkans.ii Subsequently, accession negotiations were launched with Albania and North Macedonia in July 2022, and Bosnia and Herzegovina attained candidate status in December 2022.ⁱⁱⁱ Slow progress has been noted in the accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia, particularly regarding Serbia’s alignment with EU foreign and security policies, as expected of candidate states.^iv 

Public opinion research conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) underscores these worrisome trends in the Western Balkans.​ ​For example, the 2021 regional poll revealed uniformly negative trends since the 2018 poll regarding support for democratic norms and citizens’ perception of foreign actors. Around two-thirds of the population surveyed believe that democracy in their nations is either worsening or remaining stagnant. While a majority still view democracy as the preferred system of government, as Figure 1 shows, there is a growing scepticism regarding the practical achievement of democratic ideals. Disinformation and foreign illiberal influences ricochet across the region, negatively affecting public attitudes towards democratisation processes (NDI, 2022a).  

People also associate democracy with the rule of law and equality under the law, but there is a lack of support for more liberal European values, particularly in terms of minority and LGBTQ+ inclusion (see Figure 2). These trends indicate the fragility of democracy around the region as the rights of minorities are always the first to be attacked on the road to authoritarianism. 

Shifting allegiances: The West vs Russia and China 

While the West, especially the United States and the European Union, have traditionally enjoyed popularity in the region, a noticeable decline in support has occurred. Russia and China are actively engaging in aggressive disinformation campaigns that promote anti-Western and anti-democratic narratives, influencing public attitudes. Public backing for the EU has waned, with increasing favourability towards the Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia (Haddad, 2021). This shift has been triggered in part by aggressive disinformation campaigns by Russia and China (Sunter, 2020).  

The Western Balkan region has re-emerged on the world stage as a focal point for great-power competition.​​ While China advances its Belt and Road Initiative, featuring a substantial Balkan component, Russia is concurrently establishing itself as a prominent cyber player, exerting disruptive influence through global disinformation and engaging in hacking attacks on governmental and corporate networks (HIR, 2020). Policymakers must not forget that, in the contemporary multipolar global landscape, smaller nations, such as those in the Balkans, can assume a significant strategic role. Should a major global power continue to fail to meet its needs, these smaller countries are prepared to engage with alternative competing forces. We must grasp the critical importance of the Balkans region to major powers due to strategic, political, and economic considerations – and act more boldly to ensure the security of the region.  

Consequently, the NDI regional poll (NDI, 2022a) suggests that more individuals are exploring geopolitical alternatives as a ‘quick fix’ to improve their quality of life, creating space for malign foreign influencers and their disinformation campaigns. Disturbingly, there is now equal support for autocratic leadership and democracy, as people no longer associate the quality of life with democratic values or prioritise the European integration process. Ultimately, most people across the region are willing to sacrifice democracy for an improvement in their quality of life, even if it proves unsustainable.  

The poll (NDI, 2022a) also indicates that favorability towards the EU is high, though there are some weak spots in Serbia. In contrast, Russia is viewed favorably in most Western Balkans countries, with the exceptions of Albania and Kosovo.  

The final Figure (8) comparing views on Russia’s military strength vs that of NATO conveys a significant narrative about the disinformation campaigns that have fuelled pro-Russian and anti-Western/anti-NATO sentiments. Notably, most the largest majorities of negative views of NATO originate from​​​ ​Serbia and Slovakia, the latter of which is a member of both a NATO and the EU member country. Conversely. At the same time, vulnerabilities are evident in North Macedonia and Montenegro despite their NATO membership, although neither is an EU member (NID, 2022a). 

Security challenges intertwined with the intricate tapestry of democratic governance 

The need for a comprehensive strategy has become increasingly evident as disinformation campaigns, manipulation of public opinion, and eroding trust in democratic institutions are intertwined and together undermine the very essence of European security. Addressing these issues urgently requires a thoughtful and interconnected response. 

The region’s historical backdrop, characterised by ethnic and political divides, plays a pivotal role in shaping the challenges that it faces. External actors have sought to exploit these divisions; thus, it is imperative to bridge gaps and foster inter-ethnic dialogue. It is clear that building a resilient democratic environment hinges on mitigating ethnic tensions, acknowledging their potential to compromise national security.  

While enduring political principles such as the rule of law, transparency, and anti-corruption serve as essential long-term defences against illegitimate influence, immediate measures to counter hostile foreign interference involve several impactful strategies. T​​hese include raising awareness across various levels, dismantling, and exposing the mechanisms employed for spreading manipulative messages, emphasising lessons learned through regional cooperation, engaging in discussions with multi-stakeholder approaches on practices and solutions with diverse audiences, and equipping decision-makers to recognise and counter disinformation efforts (Zamfir, 2020). 

Kosovo: A bellwether of security challenges  

Trends in Kosovo provide troubling insights into the challenges faced by the region. Kosovo stands at the crossroads of divergent narratives, as pro-democracy and pro-Western ideals clash with pro-Russian sentiments propagated by Serbia’s state-controlled media and consumed by Kosovo Serbs.^v In On this battleground, Kosovo Serbs find themselves trapped in media bubbles, isolated from credible information about European integration, the rule of law, and democratic institutions. Rather than fact-checking outside this bubble, Kosovo Serbs largely rely on friends and contacts for reality checks, which simply reinforces distorted news (NDI, 2022b). 

Kosovo’s media landscape is polarised, with Kosovo Albanians promoting pro-democracy narratives, while Serbia’s tightly controlled media delivers the opposite, questioning democratic principles while spewing pro-Russia, anti-Ukraine narratives.^vi Kosovo Serbs, who constitute a crucial minority, have limited access to alternative perspectives due to under-resourced domestic Serbian outlets and language barriers. This lack of credible narratives poses a threat to Kosovo’s unity and stability, exposing the country to anti-Western, anti-democratic narratives. NDI Kosovo survey findings from 2023 reveal a divided view of democratic systems among Kosovo Serbs, with half preferring a government driven by the will of the people and the other half wanting a single group or leader to be in charge. Despite valuing characteristics such as high living standards and human rights, scepticism towards democracy persists, exacerbated by media content endorsing Russian narratives and amplifying grievances against the EU and NATO.  

Kosovo Serbs express sympathy towards Russia and China, assigning a favourable score of four out of five, viewing them as friends but not as a role model for Kosovo’s own governance structure. Misperceptions about Russian power are common, with a substantial 43 per cent believing in the superiority of the Russian military over NATOsthat Russia is militarily superior to NATO, while 23 per cent believe NATO is militarily superior military to that of Russia. A majority align with Russian narratives on the war in Ukraine, blaming NATO and the US for the consequences. Additionally, there is a notable lack of support for sanctions against Russia, with 75 per cent expressing opposition to such measures. 

Proactive and collaborative strategies 

The complex interplay of factors, including conflicted views of democracy, the erosion of institutional confidence, economic concerns, and shifting geopolitical alliances, paints a multifaceted picture of the challenges facing countries in the Western Balkans. Addressing these issues requires a nuanced approach that considers both domestic and international dynamics, as well as the role of disinformation campaigns in shaping public opinion, inter-ethnic tensions, and political instability. Key recommendations include: 

• ​​​Strengthen democratic institutions: Enhance the resilience of democratic institutions in the Western Balkans to withstand threats such as disinformation campaigns, ethnic tensions, and political instability. This should involve reforms to strengthen the rule of law, enhance accountability and transparency, and promote effective governance. 

• Enhance regional security: Recognise that the security of the Western Balkans is intricately linked to Europe’s security and its democratic values. Therefore, any threats to democracy in the Western Balkans should be viewed as direct threats to European security. Encourage the Western Balkan countries to enhance collaboration on security and defence matters through existing regional mechanisms. In addition, providing assistance and support to Western Balkan countries in reforming their defence sectors to align with NATO standards and best practices is imperative. 

• Foster international cooperation: Strengthen international cooperation to confront the challenges posed by external actors such as Russia and China. This could involve diplomatic engagements, strategic partnerships, and collaborative initiatives. 

• Counter disinformation: Develop a comprehensive strategy to counter disinformation campaigns that manipulate public opinion, exacerbate ethnic tensions, and undermine trust in democratic processes. This strategy could encompass media literacy initiatives, robust regulatory and self-regulatory frameworks, and international cooperation. 

• Address ethnic tensions: Implement policies that mitigate ethnic divisions and foster inclusivity. Resolving the festering conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo is a necessary step.  This could help create a more stable and secure environment, reducing the opportunities for external actors to exploit these divisions. 

• Promote democratic values: Encourage citizens, especially the youth, to value democracy and understand its effectiveness. This could involve education initiatives, public awareness campaigns, and opportunities for civic engagement. It is imperative for the governments and stakeholders in the Western Balkans to prioritise democratic reforms and address the underlying issues that threaten the democratic fabric of the region. By fostering transparent and accountable governance, promoting inclusive political participation, and combating corruption, the countries in the Western Balkans can work towards strengthening their democratic institutions and values. One crucial aspect is the need to strengthen the rule of law and ensure that legal institutions are independent and free from political interference. This will help in addressing issues of corruption and ensuring fair and impartial justice. 

As we reflect on the current situation, it is evident that the U.S. and EU cannot afford to overlook the political and security concerns in the Western Balkans. The challenges faced by the region, fuelled by disinformation, shifting perceptions of democracy, and geopolitical complexities, require a steadfast commitment to proactive and collaborative strategies.  Europe will be neither stable nor secure without these steps. 

References 

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• Vangelov, O. (2023). ‘EU “Creativity” over Ukraine Has Left Macedonians Frustrated’. BalkanInsight, 20 December, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/12/20/eu-creativity-over-ukraine-has-left-macedonians-frustrated/. 
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