From the day that Vladimir Putin’s Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe has been reshaping its geopolitical agenda day by day. The Black Sea region is no exception, and, among its countries, Romania has some lessons to share: while all the Western allies have been focusing their attention on the conflict in neighbouring Ukraine, they have overlooked the current Romanian governance crisis, a mistake that may have high security costs.
Starting with the bigger picture, for some countries, the danger of a widening war in Ukraine has accelerated both governmental decisions and the political and legislative effort to strengthen the country-level framework needed to anticipate more dangerous scenarios. This has been accompanied by new defence strategies and spending. In particular, the countries on Europe’s northern flank started to make rapid changes to their national security and defence frameworks as early as 2022. It only took Sweden and Finland a few months, and without a referendum, to decide that they wanted to join NATO (NATO, 2022). If we consider the case of Poland, a couple of months after the Russian invasion, in summer 2022, the country already had a new national defence law and had made the decision to increase its budget for defence to 3 per cent of GDP (Krzysztoszek, 2022). Recently, Poland encouraged other NATO members to do the same (Reuters, 2024a), while its defence budget for 2024 is set at 4 per cent of GDP (DW, 2023). Further actions continue to be taken by other countries too. Most recently, Latvia committed to providing defence aid to Ukraine equal to 0.25 per cent of its GDP each year (Reuters, 2024b).
Where does Romania stand? A recent NATO (2024) report shows reasons to worry: despite a planned 2.5 per cent of GDP spending for defence in 2023, Romania actually only spent 1.6 per cent of its GDP (Roman, 2024) below the mandatory 2 per cent. This is not surprising given the current ruling coalition, which does a lot of talking but takes little action, while the state’s inefficiency and its spending are increasing at a fast pace due to administrative spoils. For instance, the state has significantly increased the number of employees across multiple ministries and has continued to spend money hectically despite the country already having a budget deficit issue.
There is, however, a certain sense of security that may fool one into believing the country also enjoys stability. As part of NATO, Romania’s security is guaranteed. Romania has also contributed alongside the allies since the outbreak of the war with the maritime corridor, the land corridor for cereals, and the brokering of military assistance through Romanian territory.
Meanwhile, the regime in Romania sells itself to citizens as the coalition of stability. They use regional security tensions to emphasise that they – the socialists and the conservatives – as the two biggest parties, are the only ones capable of ensuring a steady and secure future for the country. Alongside NATO, security may be ensured, yet stability remains an internal challenge, and it is nowhere to be seen – not when it comes to economic, social or political factors. For the latter, they call for stability, but they really mean stagnation – Brezhnev style.
The current regime is mired in budgetary disarray and shows clear evidence of autocratic tendencies. It is worrisome that despite the democratic framework and economic measures Romania put in place together with the EU, the country is now experiencing some Putin-like habits of selective justice, meddling by the secret services in the public sphere, and media capture at unprecedented levels. Just to give a couple of concrete examples, mayors from the opposition are being harassed by public institutions such as the National Anti-Corruption Directorate; there are clear linkages between the money spent by the ruling parties and the mass media; and current secret services agents are placed in high administrative positions, such as the secretary of state initially chosen to work on Romania’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan.
Even more worrisome, immediately after the war in Ukraine broke out, the main secret services agency in the country drafted a proposal to amend its own legislation, which would have significantly increased its powers and dismantled any civilian control. After a serious public outcry by the opposition and civil society, the subject disappeared into thin air, and nobody claimed authorship of the draft proposal. The secret services continue to function in a vast grey area, with credible testimonies of interference in politics and justice, which is clearly facilitated by the lack of concrete parliamentary control.
Despite not being a pro-Putin government, as in the case of Hungary, the current Bucharest regime is still prompting serious concerns about democracy. In Romania, people live under an anti-Putin putinist-like regime. Those in positions of power talk nice to Brussels, but they copy Putin and Viktor Orbán at home. Commonly used means to avoid sanctions or push back against criticism can be identified: they harass any existing opposition, especially the democratic one. This tendency has already been identified in Romania but has not been criticised: in the name of stability, the right and left are united in the common goal to keep control over the state. Because Romania’s support to Ukraine is the priority, the US and EU member states seem to turn a blind eye to how Romania’s current ruling system is deviating from the European values and principles that the country adhered to when it became a member of the EU.
Looking ahead to the upcoming rounds of elections in Romania, the country may now have a chance to stop its democratic decay. However, as a result of continuous poor governance, 2025 could bring a budgetary crisis in Romania. The first signs of this have already been seen, even by the European Commission itself: the budgetary deficit it has calculated is actually bigger than the one reported by the ruling coalition. In this context, an increase in mistrust in European mechanisms arises and potentially also a pushback against the EU, one caused by the current political will, mimicking stability for electoral gain instead of actually governing in the interest of the country and its citizens. The risk of a budgetary and political crisis in 2025, as the result of poor governance, is real. It may pave the way for the rise of populism, and that will surely be a more difficult issue on which to intervene.
An indirect effect of the war in Ukraine is that wobbly systems, such as the one in Romania, risk descending into autocracy.
If the EU and NATO do not intervene now, the country risks bankruptcy and the strengthening of existing anti-European positions, both in government and in society. Brussels might want to stop downplaying it right now, or we may end up with another country in Europe ruled like Orbán’s Hungary.
References
- DW. (2023). ‘Poland to Ramp Up Defense Budget to 4% of GDP’. 30 January. https://www.dw.com/en/poland-to-ramp-up-defense-budget-to-4-of-gdp/a-64555544.
- Krzysztoszek, A. (2022). ‘Poland to Spend 5% of GDP on Defence’. Euractive, 18 July. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/poland-to-spend-5-of-gdp-on-defence/.
- NATO. (2022). ‘Finland and Sweden Submit Applications to Join NATO’. 18 May. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195468.htm.
- NATO. (2024). ‘Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023). https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/3/pdf/240314-def-exp-2023-en.pdf.
- Reuters. (2024a). ‘Polish President Says NATO Members Should Spend 3% of GDP on Defence’. 11 March. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-president-says-nato-members-should-spend-3-gdp-defence-2024-03-11/.
- Reuters. (2024b). ‘Ukraine and Latvia Sign Security Agreement, Zelenskiy Says’. 11 April. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-latvia-sign-security-agreement-zelenskiy-says-2024-04-11/.
- Roman, M. (2024). ‘Breaking: Romania Spends Only 16% of GDO on Defense in 2023, Falling Short of the 2.5% Promise by President Iohannis and Lagging Behind the Netherlands in New Weapons and Equipment Acquisitions’. G4Media.ro, 22 March. https://www.g4media.ro/breaking-romania-spends-only-1-6-of-gdp-on-defense-in-2023-falling-short-of-the-2-5-promise-by-president-iohannis-and-lagging-behind-the-netherlands-in-new-weapons-and-equipment-acquisitions.html.
