Experts Comment on the Possibility of an EU Army and the EU’s Response to a Changing Security Environment
Abstract
In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is facing a war in its ‘neighbourhood’. EU countries are increasing defence spending and overhauling their militaries, while questions on European defence and strategic autonomy are again being raised: should/could Europe be more independent/autonomous in its defence, and would it be possible to talk about an EU army?
Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel–Hamas war have shaken the entire world. The prospect of large-scale war looms again, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia has openly turned into an adversary. At the same time, ties between the EU and the US are being reinforced and NATO seems to have ‘awakened’. However, Europe finds itself once again on the back foot, as it seems to be following the lead of the US, while there are disputes among EU countries regarding the appropriate stance towards Russia. Τhe conversation on strategic autonomy seems more relevant today than ever before – and this includes the military part.
‘Juncker calls for an EU army’: Initiating the argument
Back in 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, then EU Commission President, made headlines when he told the newspaper Welt am Sonntag that the European Union needed a joint EU army to deter Russia and other threats and reinforce the Union’s foreign policy standing around the world. Juncker argued that NATO was not enough and that a common army of the EU would help in forming foreign and security policies and enable the EU to take on responsibility around the world and react more credibly to a threat to peace in a member or neighbouring state. Juncker also said that such a force would have been useful during the Ukraine crisis.
It is worth mentioning that the current Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, then Defence Minister of Germany, welcomed this proposal, saying to a German radio station that ‘our future as Europeans will at some point be with a European army’. Moreover, although Juncker said that he did not want such a force to challenge the role of NATO, there were negative reactions from the UK (a Member State then), with a government spokesman saying that the country’s position was that defence is a national and not an EU responsibility (David Cameron, as Prime Minister, had resisted moves to create EU-controlled military forces in the past, too).
Juncker returned to the topic on other occasions, for example, in 2016, when he told reporters in Berlin that ‘we have a lot to thank the Americans for … but they won’t look after Europe’s security forever’. However, he emphasised that this had nothing to do with Donald Trump’s victory in the US elections.
The current state: Europe ‘awakened’
The EU Battlegroups (multinational military units, usually composed of 1,500 personnel each, that form an integral part of the European Union’s military rapid reaction capacity to respond to crises and conflicts around the world, but which have never been deployed or used operationally, despite being operational since 2007) have already been formed, and the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) is being developed, which will enable the EU to respond to conflicts with a deployment consisting of up to 5,000 troops. Furthermore, the EU has been very active in assisting Ukraine, and many European countries are increasing their military expenditures and moving forward with rearmament programmes. In addition, the EU undertook Operation Aspides (EUNAVFOR Aspides) for the protection of commercial vessels crossing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from Houthi attacks originating from Yemen. It is the biggest operation of its kind in the history of the EU. All in all, it seems that the EU is becoming militarily stronger and more willing to use military assets to protect its interests.
MEP Nathalie Loiseau, chair of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, points out regarding Ukraine that, together with the US, Canada, Japan, the UK, and others, the EU took a common and united approach based on three pillars: humanitarian support, financial support, and support in terms of military equipment. ‘For the first time, the EU is able to deliver arms to a partner country through the European Peace Facility mechanism’, she mentioned at the time this piece was written. What makes Ukraine’s resistance possible, MEP Loiseau says, is the quality and resilience of its army and the determination of its people, but it is also thanks to the many Western arms supplies, and we are entering a phase where Western countries have to renew their stocks of arms and ammunition. As she points out, all EU Member States have decided to significantly increase the share of their budget dedicated to armaments. More importantly, she adds, there is a need to spend more and better at the European level, because the aim is to have equipment that corresponds to common individual needs and that is compatible with that of others. ‘If we put all the European budgets together, we would be the second largest military power in the world. If we are not, it is because we have an extreme fragmentation of our defence industries, and therefore of our equipment’, she points out.
Dr Christos Ziogas, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of the Mediterranean Studies Department at the University of the Aegean, states that the topic of security has been re-examined as a European goal ever since 2017 and the Rome Declaration – adding that it was expected that the war in Ukraine would bring the topic of European defence to the fore. However, he says, up to now the war has been managed within an Atlantic context, mainly on the basis of US/Anglo-Saxon choices: ‘It is known that, in foreign policy, defence and security, European policy is still done in an intergovernmental level – the decisions are taken from the European Council, after they have been agreed by the leaders of the Member States.’
On March 2022 the Strategic Compass was approved, which is supposed to show the way towards reinforcing and developing the EU’s military arm. There is also a timetable on the goals of the aforementioned EU RDC, which is based on the agreement regarding the EU Battlegroups. The EU RDC would be deployed on operations and missions outside the EU (e.g. search and rescue, peacekeeping, stabilisation).
MEP Loiseau says that the Strategic Compass, as a roadmap, sets the course and objectives for European security and defence policies for the next ten years and identifies the tools to achieve it, including the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility. The preparation of the Compass itself has been an unprecedented exercise in the history of the Union, with all European intelligence services putting together their threat analyses, their priorities, and the motivation behind them, ‘making it possible to acquire and further develop a common strategic culture’, as she says. At the same time, she recognises that the EU Battlegroups have not been a success, so it is therefore better to think together about what sort of attack the Member States may face in the future (e.g. cyberattack, emergency evacuation, conventional attack), instead of solely focusing on troops. As she points out, the Rapid Reactiοn Capability is not a ‘European army’ as such, but it is about making European armies capable of training together, coordinating and supporting each other, and, generally speaking, defending their common security. ‘We are truly at the start of a new era in European defence’, she says.
As well-informed sources mention, full operational capabilities would be required up to 2025 for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which – according to these sources – would be the preferred headquarters for the EU RDC while it operates under particular scenarios. That would mean that the MPCC should be fully staffed, with proper facilities in Brussels and modern communication and command and control equipment, allowing combined arms operations, along with operations in space and in cyberspace. Moreover, it should have the means and capabilities to deploy and operate far from the EU’s borders, and the EU RDC should train so that it is capable of operating within the parameters of certain scenarios and areas. Beyond these, the concept of European air operations is under development, with the aforementioned sources saying that capabilities for cyber and space operations should be developed in the coming years.
However, commenting on the EU’s Strategic Compass and the EU RDC, Dr Dominika Kunertova, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies, points out that replacing the Common Security and Defence Policy to further federalise the EU looks unlikely in the near future, as this would require changes to the treaty to make defence and security more flexible and actionable by introducing qualified majority voting. Furthermore, as she says, the EU RDC of 5,000 troops is hardly an EU army, but rather a rapid reaction force to be deployed in case of crises. As for the EU Battlegroups, she points out that they have never been used, mostly because EU countries ‘have an incoherent vision for the EU’s mission in the security and defence domain’.
Strategic autonomy
The question of an EU army is linked to the topic of strategic autonomy for the EU in general. Dr Constantinos Filis, director of the ACG Institute of Global Affairs and an associate professor at the American College of Greece, believes that the matter of strategic autonomy belongs more to the realm of theory than to practice:
One of its prerequisites would be becoming (strategically) autonomous from NATO. Otherwise, it is not autonomy but complementarity. I believe we’re far from something like that. I am not sure at all that NATO and the US would like to see the EU become truly autonomous – it would be completely different, now that NATO has been rejuvenated, to get into a discussion about the EU becoming autonomous.
As Dr Filis points out, most European countries are already NATO members, and there are also economic factors at play. Up to now, the US has carried most of the burden for NATO – 70 per cent of the Alliance’s total defence spending, paying for the European nations’ security, too. ‘I can’t say that I realistically see the EU moving towards strategic autonomy – but towards complementarity in regards to NATO, instead’. Dr Filis believes that the events in Ukraine have greatly empowered and reinforced NATO, so strategic autonomy for Europe is a possibility that seems to be receding.
Generally speaking, it seems that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not causing the EU to start becoming more strategically independent or autonomous at all. As Dr Ziogas points out, after many months of bitter fighting in Ukraine, the positions of the Eastern European countries regarding NATO’s premier role in matters of defence and security, with the EU playing a complementary role, seem to have been reinforced, rather than the opposite.
Dr Kunertova, for her part, mentions that Sweden and Finland joining NATO sends a clear signal regarding which institution is in charge of defence in Europe and is the most trusted in the face of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, while also pointing out regional initiatives such as the ‘European Sky Shield Initiative’.
Threats to Europe
According to well-informed sources, the greatest threat, which ‘not everyone thinks about in the same way’, is the encirclement of Europe by revisionist forces, including the ‘axis’ of Russia and Turkey, extending from the Black Sea to the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Northern Africa – and even trying to expand towards the Sahel and Central Africa. Generally speaking, it is believed that the only states facing military threats are those in the north and in the east because of Russia and China. They also point out that on a more ‘bureaucratic’ level, the EU’s ‘worst nightmare’ is the possibility of an attack by a NATO member state against an EU country.
Asked about the threats to Europe, Dr Filis says that the term ‘military threats’ seems ‘traditional/old school’ or out of date in our time, as Europe is facing at the same time a military threat, immigration, threats to infrastructure, energy, and hybrid threats, including cyberattacks:
When we talk about a military threat, we talk about invasions, air attacks, missile attacks, etc. On the one hand, I would not think that there would be a real possibility of something like that in Europe, excluding, of course, Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, however, would it be safe to say something like that after Ukraine? However, Russia, Turkey, and other powers – I do not think that they would start a conventional conflict. An unconventional approach would be more possible, for example, separatist movements, extreme right and Eurosceptic movements, propaganda, and fake news.
Dr Kunertova classifies Russia as a military threat to Europe, pointing out that nuclear dangers are ‘not fiction’. In that vein, she points out the need to maintain unity and Western resolve while dealing with the energy crisis and continuing to support Ukraine, along with the need for Europe to strengthen defence and deterrence without giving Putin an excuse to escalate the war. She also stresses that it should be ensured that the supply of energy commodities from Russia is discontinued, that European indigenous military capabilities are built up, and that European supply chains are not vulnerable to external disruptions. Beyond Russia, Dr Kunertova characterises China’s infrastructure projects as an economic threat.
However, not everyone agrees on the scale of the actual military threat posed by Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Dr Ziogas doubts that Russia should be considered a conventional military threat to Europe. The war in Ukraine has revealed unexpected shortcomings in the Russian army, whose prestige has taken a serious hit:
The Russian Federation has been clearly classified – doubtlessly, after the NATO summit at Vilnius – as a threat to the West, and this will be hard to change while Vladimir Putin remains as a leader of the country. Undoubtedly, the end of the war in Ukraine will redefine the axis that defines the European order – at least in the second quarter of the twenty-first century. The European security architecture will be mainly about the development of the Euro-Atlantic relations and, of course, Russia’s role and position.
It is a fact that, in the periphery of the EU, the majority of the sixteen countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy are facing internal or bilateral problems which undermine regional cooperation and stability. The war between Israel and Hamas is another serious crisis close in proximity to the EU. Obviously, there is no direct military threat to the EU, but the problematic conditions affect security in the European space. At the same time, Turkey, despite the reduction of tensions during the last months, is promoting its revisionist foreign policy, threatening two EU Member States – Greece and the Republic of Cyprus – with military force. So, the possibility that an EU Member State gets in a military conflict with Turkey has not disappeared.
European army: Views from Greece
Taking all this into account, is it possible to still talk about a ‘true’ EU army? It is worth mentioning that the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, has talked about a ‘mature proposal’, and the Minister of Defence, Nikos Dendias, has repeatedly talked about promoting a common defence culture in the EU and calling for an autonomous defence branch that would be compatible with NATO and work with it.
The Greek experts who spoke with the journal Future Europe think there are many hurdles along the way. Apart from the strictly practical/military complications that come with it (integration of units and troops from different militaries, with different equipment, training, etc.), there is the burning question of mandate. For example, would an EU army enter and operate somewhere that NATO does not? Would there be a mandate from another international organisation? As Dr Filis points out, this is something that would happen more on an ad hoc basis – perhaps in the context of an agreement between some Member States (for example like what was agreed between France and Greece regarding the Sahel):
This is the kind of agreement I would expect to see, bilateral or multilateral – not in a really European context, but between countries. For example, in a crisis, would the EU army intervene without NATO’s knowledge and agreement? Obviously not. So, why would not NATO intervene itself? However, on some occasions, it might actually be better to send the EU army instead of NATO. We are always talking about complementarity.
Regarding the rearmament of EU Member States, Dr Ziogas says that France has been expanding and increasing its role and capabilities (especially since Brexit), while Germany and Poland are increasing their military strength. Generally speaking, more or less all EU Member States have decided to improve their defence capabilities. He adds that if the Member States decided to create an EU army, it is Germany that would define, by its stance, the force’s main characteristics. Berlin has obviously realised, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that Germany’s lack of military strength reduces its capability to exert more serious influence. However, he does not seem certain at all that the war in Ukraine would speed up the procedures for creating an EU army. Αs he notes, a key point for a potential decision on the creation of an EU army and its structure would be its relation to NATO – and how the US and the UK would accept the transfer of forces from the Atlantic context to the European one, and, in addition to that, independently from NATO:
If there is a decision to start something like that, it is my belief that there will be disagreements among EU Member States on where its command/headquarters would be, on its staffing and on its funding. The most likely scenario would be the option of complementarity: this would mean that the main Atlantic choices in the fields of defence and security will be preserved, there will be no cases of strategic divergence regarding the position and role held by Germany, and, in terms of a public gesture, the pro-European positions will be satisfied.
However, he clarifies that it is premature to talk about an EU army independent of the Atlantic context if there is no political decision about the defence autonomisation of the EU.
In conclusion, realistically speaking, there does not seem to be a real chance for the creation of a true EU army as an independent, strategically autonomous military force – at least in the foreseeable future. The most prevalent idea within NATO seems to be that the best way to proceed would be the formation of an ‘army’, without calling it an army, with the EU investing in aligning technical standards and procedures between the armies of the different countries so that, if the need arises, they will be able to ‘merge’ and act as one powerful military force.
War, common defence, and European societies: Public opinion
Polls show that most Europeans are in favour of common defence – although things are a bit more complicated regarding a common army. In an EU-wide survey carried out in June 2023, the Eurobarometer demonstrated wide support among European citizens for stronger EU defence cooperation and increased defence spending. The support for a common defence and security policy among EU Member States remained steady at 77 per cent. Over the longer term, public support has been relatively stable since spring 2020. The majority of citizens in each Member State are in favour of a common defence and security policy among EU Member States, with support ranging from 92 per cent of respondents in Luxembourg to 56 per cent in Austria, 65 per cent in Malta, and 66 per cent in Bulgaria. Eight in ten Europeans agree that cooperation in defence matters at the EU level should be increased, 77 per cent agree that Member States’ coordinated purchases of military equipment should be improved, and two-thirds (66 per cent) of EU citizens agree that more money should be spent on defence in the EU.
The fifth edition of the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit’s (European Parliament) assembly of surveys on the war in Ukraine focused on surveys conducted or published from 25 March to 1 April 2022. Among others, in a multi-country survey, on the issue of a common EU army, 60 per cent were in favour, with the greatest support seen in Portugal, Poland, Belgium, Lithuania, Spain, and Romania.
In a YouGov poll conducted with the European University Institute for the 2022 State of the Union conference in Florence, it was shown that support had risen for an integrated European army since the previous year. Of the seventeen countries surveyed, there was net support for an integrated European army in all except Britain, the only non-EU member surveyed, which was split 34 per cent in support and 35 per cent opposed.
However, a research paper (European Public Opinion on the Challenges and Future of EU Foreign and Security Policy – JOINT) illustrating the results of a survey conducted in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain reveals a strong demand for more EU Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP). However, although there is support for greater defence capacities at the EU level, the majority remain unwilling to relinquish national armies for a unified force: 61 per cent of respondents view the coordination of national armies at the EU level as the best possible solution. The concept of an EU army replacing national armies is supported by only 21 per cent in Italy, 19 per cent in Germany, 18 per cent in Spain, 16 per cent in Greece, 16 per cent in France, and 13 per cent in Spain.
Generally, it could be said that there are two tendencies within Europe: the countries that depend on NATO for their security (mainly Eastern European countries, the Baltics, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, and Germany) and the south (France, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus) have a different understanding about security. In that vein, it should be noted that it is the southern European countries that possess both considerable air/naval and land military strength. In general, Europeans perceive threats according to geography: those along the external borders feel the threat from revisionist powers such as Russia and Turkey, while that is not the case for Central Europe.
In addition, the conflict has shown once again that geopolitics and foreign relations and affairs do not evolve or move as we would like, and that war and the use of military force are still included in the ‘toolboxes’ of nation states – especially the more powerful ones.
As Dr Ziogas says, after the Second World War and the Cold War, the West experienced unprecedented prosperity and security – but the situation is evolving. It cannot be said with certainty whether the crises on Europe’s periphery and within it will affect European integration/unification in a positive way. As Dr Ziogas notes, ‘it cannot be disputed that, when the prosperity and security of the European societies are threatened, the political agenda is redefined. The multiple crises that the EU has experienced during the last decade have brought into light the realities and the true extent of its integration in terms of societies, not declarations or the wishes of the elites. The current res gestae are showing that European societies are still not ready to accept further transfer of powers from nation states to the EU.’
