Powering a New World Order?

The eternal battle: from Pericles to Zelenskyy

Thucydides’ (460–395 bce) masterpiece History of the Peloponnesian War is required reading in many classes on international relations, strategy, and security studies. The importance of this Greek classic has once again become evident in the twenty-first century, when interstate wars, overt and covert means of coercion, and pandemics have disrupted societies’ normal way of life. Thucydides interrupted his account of the Peloponnesian War to describe the famous Plague of Athens, which occurred at the start of the summer in 430 bce (Martin & Martin-Granel, 2006). The plague affected not only the war but also the development of the city (city-state) and influenced the history of Athens, resulting in the defeat of the Athenian democracy by the Spartan oligarchy (Kelaidis, 2020). This historical event clearly shows that many interdependent events and processes affect the trajectory of countries and societies, triggering wars and shaping peace; but it also features almost all the components that today we call critical infrastructure – governance (democracy vs oligarchy), ports, public health, city-state infrastructure, safety, and so forth – and their resiliency is translated into the degree of national resiliency.  

The post-Second World War rules-based liberal world order brought significant benefits to societies in the form of economic prosperity and security and opened new opportunities, powering the process of globalisation. At the same time, the risks and challenges posed by global disruptive events became internationalised, characterised by a highly complex interdependency (World Economic Forum, n.d.). Since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both sides of the axis – democratic nations and revisionist authoritarians – have been drawing their own lessons and adjusting their strategies. Ukraine’s resistance against the Russian invasion will go down in history as a shining example of bravery, but once the war approaches its conclusion, the primary goal of the Ukrainians, and of the democratic world, should be to play the endgame in a way that will lay the foundation of a new, more peaceful and stable world order.  

The energy of geopolitics: chain reaction 

Over the past two decades, authoritarian regimes have consolidated their anti-democratic alliance, promoting a world order centred on ‘spheres of influence’, and adopted an aggressive stance. Putin made this clear at the 2007 Munich Security Conference (Fried & Volker, 2022), and he fired the first salvo in 2008 by invading Georgia, triggering a geopolitical chain reaction. This invasion was followed by military actions against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. China has, directly or indirectly, supported these moves, bringing the ongoing struggle between democracy and autocracy to a critical juncture where the existing rules-based world order has been irreparably undermined, and the contours of the emerging global order are not yet clear and will depend on how the war ends. This struggle is not only ideological but also driven by the geography and resources of the so-called world island,¹ where the authoritarian regimes of Russia and China are positioning themselves to gain the upper hand in order to ‘control the world’, as Mackinder wrote decades ago. The contested geographic area largely covers the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where Russia’s concept of Eurasianism, a modern iteration of the USSR, mostly aligns with China’s global security and development initiatives. 

Ukraine’s resistance against Russia, backed by the democratic world and reinforced by sanctions, has depleted Moscow’s resources. Yet, with China’s help, Russia continues to wage a war of attrition. Meanwhile, the prolonged conflict in Eastern Europe has fostered isolationist sentiments in the West, creating an opportunity for China to expand its influence over Central Asia. China is slowly usurping Russia’s political and economic clout in the Central Asia and Caucasus region, securing unchallenged access to its vast strategic resources in critical minerals, including rare earth metals. 

The South Caucasus and Central Asia is the seventh-largest region in the world by territory, comparable in size to the European Union, with Kazakhstan being the largest country. Although its population is relatively small, at 100 million, the region’s nominal GDP of around $640 billion places it among the world’s top 25 economies. It is also one of the richest regions in terms of natural resources, producing 54 per cent of the world’s uranium, 6 per cent of its gas, 3.5 per cent of its oil, and 2.5 per cent of its gold, along with significant deposits of rare earth metals and other strategic minerals. The region also has the largest arable land area globally after the US, Russia, and Ukraine. 

These resources sustained the Soviet Union’s ultimately unsustainable economic model for 70 years. Today, Russia continues to benefit from this legacy, using its geographic and logistical dominance to wield influence. Beyond its predatory hydrocarbon policies, issues such as nuclear energy, strategic minerals, and wheat production remain critically important. Nearly all Central Asian uranium is processed in Russia for the Rosatom supply chain, which generated $19 billion in 2021.  

Today, transparent, market-based access to the resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia is vital for the Western and global agenda, including energy security, decarbonisation, access to strategic materials, microchip production, military industry, and supply chain diversification. This context forms the economic foundation for Western strategic engagement. 

In 2022, the EU and the five Central Asian nations expressed their commitment to developing sustainable connectivity between Central Asia and the EU. At the COP27 conference in Egypt in November 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signed a memorandum of understanding with the Kazakh prime minister on establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ between the two sides (European Commission, 2022; Romano, 2022). Kazakhstan has the capacity to supply all 30 critical raw materials that the EU needs (European Commission, n.d.). 

In April 2024, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited all five countries in Central Asia in an attempt to increase engagement with this pivotal region. Cameron was the first British foreign secretary to visit Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and the first to visit Uzbekistan since 1997 (Gov.UK, 2024). His visit followed the release of a UK Parliament report titled ‘Countries at Crossroads: UK Engagement in Central Asia’, which called deepening ties ‘a geopolitical imperative’ (Rickleton, 2024). 

Geopolitical interests and strategic resources could be realised through the development of secure, stable, and reliable logistical access to the ‘Eastern European gateway to the Eurasian landmass’, a concept tied to strategic connectivity between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Russia and China will continue to exert their disruptive influence over these connections, with the Black Sea region being a primary target. Control over strategic infrastructure, such as the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, awarded to a controversial Chinese company by Georgia’s pro-Russian government, is a clear example (Standish & Pertaia, 2024; The Economist, 2024).² 

Georgia is a critical missing piece in this strategic puzzle. In the absence of robust Western policy, Russia has already made significant advances by undermining Georgia’s democratic credentials and altering its pro-Western foreign policy (Gavin, 2024). The joint pre-war ultimatum from Russia and China included a demand for the West to abandon its goal of integrating Ukraine and Georgia into European and Euro-Atlantic structures (President of Russia, 2022). 

Georgia’s strategic importance cannot be overstated. As a vital middle corridor for trade, energy, and access to the critical minerals of Central Asia, it offers an alternative to routes dominated by Russia and China. The Black Sea region is central to Euro-Atlantic security, and Georgia hosts its eastern gateway. 

The legacy of distrust between Western investors and regional governments, as well as between the governments themselves, poses significant challenges. Western political and financial commitment, coupled with high-profile strategic engagement, could help regional governments align their policies and implement reforms to attract new investors. US leadership along with EU strategic engagement could play a decisive role in overcoming these challenges (Shaheen, 2022). The West’s strategic interests are about ensuring energy security, advancing the green economic transformation, and securing access to critical resources.  

Transparent investments in infrastructure, alongside necessary security arrangements, could create a more prosperous, peaceful, and secure global order, countering Sino-Russian authoritarian influence over the ‘heartland’ and establishing a sustainable, rules-based international system.  

Lessons from Ukraine: resilience, resilience, resilience 

The many geopolitical challenges currently posed by authoritarian regimes to democratic societies include those above and below the threshold of open military confrontation. An effective response to those challenges requires a holistic understanding of the threats and challenges, and the highest possible interoperability with partner democracies. This can be achieved by implementing thorough reforms, modernisation, and adaptation of governance and policymaking institutions coupled with strong security arrangements. Such resilience will depend on the democratic reformation of the state and security guarantees. This is not a finite process but rather a constantly evolving and irreversible one, whether in peacetime or wartime. The war in Ukraine has highlighted that resilience is more than a national issue. Interconnected critical infrastructure creates a chain reaction effect on a global scale.  

Critical infrastructure comprises the systems, assets, facilities, and networks that provide essential services for the functioning of the economy and the safety and well-being of the population.³ According to the OECD classification, there are ten principal critical infrastructures to consider: government, finance, energy and utilities, health, manufacturing, safety, transportation, food, information, and communication. The disruptions of the twenty-first century have made clear the necessity of a proper understanding of the key critical infrastructure, the risks associated with them, and, most importantly, the complex interdependence of those infrastructures, which challenges economies and especially societies. The biggest challenge is the interdependence of these critical infrastructures and the cascading effect of disruptions, leading to further crises. 

Resilience can be defined as the capacity of critical infrastructure to absorb a disturbance, recover from disruptions, and adapt to changing conditions while still retaining essentially the same function as prior to the disruptive shock (OECD, 2014). This definition includes the ability to withstand shocks with as little loss of functionality as possible under specific circumstances, limiting the duration of potential service interruption by minimising recovery time, and adapting to new conditions and improving systems’ functionality (Chang et al., 2014).  

The resilience shown by Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 did not emerge from a vacuum. Following Russia’s aggression and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian state and government failed to demonstrate any resilience against Russian aggression. Five months before the 2022 invasion, on 21 September 2021, President Volodymyr Zelensky approved the concept of introducing a national resilience system. This concept was fully in line with NATO’s baseline requirements on resilience and mandated a whole-of-government approach (Roepke & Thankey, 2019). When Russia invaded, it targeted civilian infrastructure, especially energy infrastructure, affecting not only Ukrainian energy security but also that of Europe as a whole. 

Ukraine’s power system is in the midst of one of the greatest trials in human history. It has already survived 31 Russian onslaughts since February 2022. Of this unprecedented number, 13 missile and drone attacks took place in 2024 (Derentz et al., 2025). According to officials, more than 2,000 missiles and countless drones have targeted Ukrainian power plants and high-voltage substations since the beginning of the full-scale war. Ukraine has sought to make its energy supplies resilient by focusing on physical protection, back-up plans, and decentralised power grids, both internally and across borders. Particular emphasis has been given to its nuclear power plants, which have been repeatedly targeted by Russian attacks and have been used to blackmail Ukraine’s Western allies. 

Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has long been identified by NATO as the primary target of Russian overt and covert operations. The NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence in 2020 pointed to energy blackmail as one of the main weapons in Russia’s hybrid warfare against Ukraine and Europe due to its high degree of interdependency. Russia’s direct use of the energy sector as a weapon in the pre-crisis period (up to 2014) contributed to the inclusion of the energy dimension in the present concept of hybrid warfare. During the period between 2014 and 2017, a series of energy-related events led to internal disruptions in Ukraine.⁴ After the 2022 invasion, Ukraine delinked from the Russian electricity grid and switched to integration with the European transmission infrastructure. As was predicted, Russia’s military then launched devastating airstrikes against energy infrastructure. As a result of the targeted missile attacks, 60 per cent of the electricity generation and transmission capacity has been damaged. More traumatic still are the human losses among power network personnel. In the first year of the Russian invasion of 2022, one of the largest private electricity generating companies has lost 136 employees, 328 have been injured, 25 have gone missing, and four are being held prisoner⁵. 

Ukraine has receiving a significant amount of aid from the United States, valued at $897 million (for generators, gas turbine power plants, and transformers). The EU’s Ukraine Energy Support Fund has already contributed $182 million. The Ukrainian government has committed $270 million towards the restoration and preparation of the country’s energy infrastructure for the forthcoming winter. Synchronisation with the European grid has created a solid base to rebuild more resilient energy infrastructure. Commercial cross-border capacity is now 700MW, but there are plans to increase it to 1,500MW with the synchronised European system and to add another 1,000MW of capacity on an isolated line to Poland. For this further reforms and energy diplomacy steps are to be implemented. 

Considering the terrorist tactics Russia used at the Kakhovka Dam hydroelectric power plant and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the likelihood of Russia repeating its tactics in the upcoming winters or critical moments of the war could be well predicted⁶. While mitigating the immediate effects of the war, Ukraine is also looking towards a more sustainable future. The country aims to build a resilient, decentralised, renewable energy grid, which would offer increased energy independence and resilience. At the policy level, Ukraine has combined emergency measures like rolling blackouts and infrastructure repairs with long-term reforms, including grid interconnections and renewable energy legislation aligned with EU standards. These changes, backed by international partners, point to decentralization and clean 

energy as core pillars of resilience ⁷.  

Since the beginning of the war US has supported Ukraine with  comprehensive energy programs, including U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) program, which is providing tools and technical support to Ukraine to realize a resilient, decentralized, renewable energy grid.⁸  To further advance and modernize Ukraine’s nuclear energy capabilities, The United States and Ukraine Announce Partnership on Leading Edge Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Projects at COP29.⁹ On Wednesday, April 30, 2025, the United States and Ukraine signed a long-awaited deal (so called Minerals Deal)¹⁰ to establish a joint investment fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine¹¹. Reconstruction and modification of the energy infrastructure is the key part to implement this deal. 

This short synopsis of Ukraine’s energy reform agenda and energy diplomacy could be translated into a broader blueprint for European energy security, putting energy at the centre of the new European security architecture – and its holistic resilience strategy.  

The geopolitics of energy: chain reaction again 

Besides military tools and hard coercion, Russia has tested separately and jointly its tools of hybrid warfare by weaponising every component of its relations with the West. Energy has become one of the primary targets of this warfare, since hydrocarbons were a major source of revenue for Russia, with which it funded both conventional war and other domains of hybrid warfare – including corruption and propaganda. 

Europe’s energy policy and relevant infrastructure were not prepared for this scenario and, more importantly, were not resilient and agile enough to be able to address the challenge and swiftly adapt in accordance with its economic, political, and strategic interests. In the third year of the war, EU imports of Russian fossil fuels surpassed the amount of financial aid it sent to Ukraine (CREA, 2025). Despite a range of sanctions and the threat posed by dependence on Russian energy, since the beginning of the war, EU imports of Russian fossil fuels remain largely unchanged, totalling €21.9 billion, a 6 per cent year-on-year drop in value but merely a 1 per cent year-on-year drop in volume. 

By targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Russia is maintaining its ability to increase energy prices in Europe (Eruygur, 2025). Similarly, Russia has launched its proxy energy wars with the EU in countries where it has political goals and has already deployed an enabling network to alter their pro-Western democratic choices. Moldova is a good example. After the decision by Kyiv to stop the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, Gazprom, without exploiting alternative routes such as the Trans-Balkan pipeline, unilaterally cut off supplies to Transnistria, a Russophile breakaway state of Moldova that proclaimed itself a republic in 1990, leaving the region’s more than 350,000 inhabitants without light and heat (De La Feld, 2025). The EU has allocated €250 million in aid. These are emergency measures, but they will not solve the problem for the foreseeable future. Strategic policy should be focused on making the energy network adaptable to existing hybrid warfare challenges, increasing the resilience of critical infrastructure, and powering the next-generation digital economy. Therefore, the EU’s new energy strategy goal should be to minimise the toxic interdependencies on fossil energy resources by diversifying sources, with a strong emphasis on fissile energy (‘split-baby-split’). A recent survey of insights from leading industry, civil society, and government voices and relevant essays from across sectors by the Atlantic Council (n.d.) has revealed several interesting findings: 

1. The Black Sea region and geopolitical and energy security challenges 

The continuation of Russia’s war in Ukraine is a major geopolitical risk (26 per cent of respondents identified it as a primary threat). The Black Sea region remains a critical battleground for energy security due to Russia’s influence over energy transport routes. 

The EU’s energy vulnerability persists as Russian fossil fuel exports continue despite sanctions. Securing alternative energy transit routes through the Black Sea is crucial. 

2. The future of nuclear energy in the EU 

Nuclear energy is expected to see increased investment in 2025, with 11 per cent of respondents selecting it as a priority sector for growth, a rise from the previous year. 

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are gaining traction, with respondents acknowledging their role in providing a stable baseload for the EU’s energy transition. 

3. Anticipations for energy transition and security 

The EU’s net-zero transition faces political and financial barriers, with 61 per cent of respondents citing lack of political will and 53 per cent mentioning rising costs as major obstacles. 

Natural gas remains significant but is losing its dominance, with 48 per cent of respondents stating that gas will serve as a bridge fuel, with demand decreasing over time. 

Hydrogen and energy storage investments are accelerating, with hydrogen investment ranking higher than fossil fuels in future energy priorities.

These findings highlight the EU’s need for alternative energy diversification, stronger energy security measures in the Black Sea region, and sustained investment in nuclear and renewables to counter geopolitical and economic risks. 

Policy recommendations for shaping the future

Geopolitical outreach beyond EU borders: the EU–Central Asia energy corridor. To reduce dependency on Russian energy and diversify energy routes, the EU should develop a new strategic energy corridor linking Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea with European markets.  

• Build strategic pipelines and interconnectors. Expand the Southern Gas Corridor to incorporate Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan via Azerbaijan and Georgia. Support Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania (AGRI) liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects to transport Caspian gas to Europe.  

• Create an EU–Caucasus energy pact. Offer long-term investment to Georgia and Azerbaijan to modernise their energy infrastructure. Strengthen bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for uranium supply and energy partnerships.  

• Secure critical minerals for renewables and nuclear. Secure lithium, uranium, and rare earth elements supply from Central Asia to support EU energy projects. Invest in processing facilities within the EU to ensure independence from China. 

• Expand NATO energy cooperation in the Black Sea. Increase naval patrols and real-time intelligence-sharing to secure energy transit routes. Develop a joint EU–Turkey security framework to protect offshore and pipeline assets in the Black Sea.

2. The EU Nuclear Resurgence Initiative (‘split-baby-split’). A three-pronged approach is needed to accelerate SMR deployment and next-generation nuclear reactors.  

• Fast-track SMR licensing and deployment. Implement a standardised regulatory approval process across EU Member States to streamline licensing. Establish regional SMR clusters in countries with strong nuclear experience. 

• Create an EU–NATO nuclear energy security framework. Enhance nuclear cybersecurity protections to prevent Russian and Chinese cyberattacks. Coordinate nuclear supply chain resilience plans with NATO for energy infrastructure defence.  

• Accelerate public–private investment. Launch SMR pilot programmes with private partners (e.g., Rolls-Royce, Westinghouse, NuScale). Provide sovereign loan guarantees for nuclear projects to lower capital costs.</BL> 

3. The European Energy Investment Accelerator. In order to expedite clean energy investments, reduce bureaucracy, and attract private capital, the EU must implement the following measures. 

• Set up a one-stop investment platform. Establish the accelerator as a central clearinghouse for nuclear, renewables, and grid projects. Streamline permitting to ensure a maximum 12-month approval period.  

• Create an EU Energy Security Fund. Pool €300 billion in funding from the European Investment Bank, private investors, and green bonds for the next 15 years. Provide direct investments towards SMRs, offshore wind, hydrogen hubs, and grid expansion.  

• Design risk-sharing mechanisms for private investors. Implement state-backed risk insurance for private nuclear and energy infrastructure projects. Expand long-term energy purchasing agreements to provide revenue certainty.  

• Accelerate public–private partnership infrastructure development. Prioritise cross-border energy projects under simplified procurement rules. Create fast-track investment zones near industrial clusters to enable rapid project deployment.</BL> 

4. (NATO+) and (EU+) Energy Shield Initiative. As energy infrastructure is increasingly targeted (cyberattacks, sabotage, hybrid warfare), NATO and the EU must integrate energy security into defence planning including non-NATO and non-EU democracies.  

• Establish a NATO Energy Security Command. Develop real-time intelligence-sharing between NATO, the EU, and energy companies. Deploy rapid response teams and uncrewed platform capabilities to counter cyber and physical attacks.  

• Harden EU energy infrastructure against hybrid threats. Invest in drone detection and anti-sabotage measures for pipelines, LNG terminals, and power grids. Deploy AI-powered energy grid monitoring to detect cyber intrusions early.  

• Pursue naval security operations for LNG and oil transit routes. Expand the NATO naval presence in the Black Sea and Mediterranean to protect tankers and pipelines. Conduct joint EU–NATO energy security drills simulating cyber and kinetic attacks.  

• Develop a strategic energy infrastructure reserve. Create a shared NATO–EU stockpile of emergency transformers, cables, and repair equipment for rapid response to attacks.</BL> 

5. Transatlantic Strategic Minerals Pact (Strategic Minerals Alliance). In order to secure uranium enrichment and reduce reliance on Russia, increase access to the strategic minerals of Ukraine and Central Asia, share mining and processing technologies, and streamline the secure supply chains, the US and EU must rebuild a resilient nuclear fuel supply chain.  

• Ban Russian nuclear fuel by 2026. Implement a full embargo on Russian uranium enrichment services. Secure supply from Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, and the US to replace Rosatom’s role.  

• Expand EU–US uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Restart Western-controlled enrichment projects (Urenco, Orano, Centrus) to reduce dependence on Russian technology. Fund advanced reprocessing facilities to recover spent fuel and boost self-sufficiency.  

• Rebuild Europe’s enrichment capacity. Increase Urenco and Orano’s enrichment output by 50 per cent to cover EU energy demands. Establish joint US–EU financing for a next-generation enrichment facility in Europe.  

Secure new fuel supply chains for SMRs. Invest in **HALEU (high-assay low-enriched uranium) production to ensure the viability of next-generation SMRs. Create strategic uranium stockpiles in EU Member States to withstand future supply disruptions.

References 

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