Serbia’s Lithium Dilemma: A Challenging Test for the EU’s Raw Materials Diplomacy

Abstract 

As the EU accelerates its pursuit of critical raw materials to support its green transition and enhance strategic autonomy, lithium – an essential component of electric vehicle batteries – has gained significant importance. This article examines the EU’s strategic interest in securing lithium through the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and evaluates Serbia’s potential role in meeting these objectives. It presents Serbia’s ‘lithium dilemma’, which involves balancing the substantial economic and strategic benefits of lithium exploitation with rising environmental and social concerns among the local population. The article argues that failing to address this dilemma could undermine the EU’s legitimacy in Serbia, especially in the context of the country’s EU accession process. It identifies three central challenges dominating public discourse in Serbia: environmental risks associated with lithium extraction, widespread public mistrust of Serbian institutions, and the fear that mining could reinforce stabilitocracy rather than foster democratic reforms. Against this backdrop, the article outlines how the EU can navigate these complexities while advancing its strategic objectives as part of its raw materials diplomacy.

Serbia as an important factor in the EU’s raw materials diplomacy

e European Commission’s 2020 communication on the need to reduce these dependencies (European Commission, 2020). The subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine further highlighted the EU’s strategic vulnerabilities, especially regarding energy reliance on Russia. This spurred the adoption of the CRMA in 2024, which emphasised the urgent need to diversify and to secure supply chains. Besides being approved in the Council, the CRMA received broad support across the European Parliament, with a rare consensus emerging among diverse political groups, signalling its enduring importance despite shifting political landscapes (HowTheyVote.eu, 2023). Moreover, as the EU enters a new institutional cycle, policy drivers such as the Letta Report and the Draghi Report underscore the CRMA’s role in mitigating risks related to supply chain concentration, particularly vis-à-vis countries that adopt assertive strategies (Letta, 2024; European Commission, 2024c). These reports highlight the geopolitical and economic imperatives of reducing dependencies, safeguarding decision-making autonomy, and enhancing strategic partnerships. Against this backdrop, the CRMA has become not only an economic strategy but also a vital geostrategic tool to safeguard the EU’s future, ensuring its competitiveness and resilience in the face of growing global challenges. 

Although the CRMA recognised the necessity to boost the EU’s own capacities to extract raw materials, the EU cannot fulfil this task on its own. Namely, the CRMA aims to reduce Europe’s dependency on non-EU countries by establishing a secure, diversified supply of critical materials. By non-EU countries, it is implied here that third parties have no EU membership perspective or have different strategic interests. In such a context, the EU has relied on its so-called raw materials diplomacy, by which it has formed partnerships with Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Greenland, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Norway, Rwanda, Ukraine, Zambia, and lastly Serbia (European Commission, n.d.). In the case of Serbia, although still outside the EU, it is a candidate country whose strategic goal has been to attain membership in the Union and whose economy primarily depends on trade with the EU, investments from EU Member States, and the EU’s pre-accession assistance. The reaffirmation of Serbia’s status as a country aligned with the EU’s worldview came with the signing, in July 2024, of the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Serbia on a Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials, Battery Value Chains and Electric Vehicles (European Union and Republic of Serbia, 2024). Although this is a non-binding instrument setting out actions of mutual interest in relation to critical raw materials,² it was supposed to increase ‘risk-sharing’, thus sending an encouraging message to investors.³ Given Serbia’s proximity to the EU and its long-term ambition to become a member, it is likely to play a prominent role in the EU’s overall efforts to secure its strategic objectives in the future.  

In pursuit of that aim, the EU is expected to identify strategic projects in third countries, with Serbia possibly at the top of that list. Given that the time horizon for utilisation of this tool is labelled as ‘short term’, that is, one to three years,⁴ this speaks volumes of their importance. In fact, the CRMA indicates that the European Commission, with the support of a special board consisting of Member States, is supposed to launch the call and assess the applications.⁵ By August 2024, the European Commission had received 170 applications, spanning all the stages of the value chain, with 77 applications focused on extraction, 58 on processing, 30 on recycling, and five on substitution (European Commission, 2024a). While 70 per cent of the applications (121) were from within the EU, 30 per cent (49) were submitted from outside the EU. Although there has been no official confirmation on whether Rio Tinto applied, if it did, and if it were selected, the Jadar project would be designated as a project of strategic importance to the EU. This would also allow it to qualify for ‘support through relevant funds’ as it would align with the CRMA’s priority actions, which emphasise the need to ‘support the diversification of supply chains’. The selection of the Jadar project as a strategic project would, therefore, signify more than just economic collaboration, signalling the EU’s readiness to invest political capital in its success while offering Serbia an important opportunity to solidify its ties with the Union. 

Serbia’s perspective on lithium: Worth as much as oil or kryptonite? 

The issue of lithium mining has rapidly become a defining issue on Serbia’s political stage, marking a dramatic shift from a decade ago when Serbia first started EU accession talks. Although some environmental concerns were raised at the time – particularly in regard to air pollution, water pollution, and waste management – their mobilisation force was weak. It was only seven years after the negotiations began, in 2021, that the first major environmental protests took place, successfully forcing the Serbian government to annul the local spatial plan for the Rio Tinto project. Now, since the Constitutional Court ruled in July 2024 that the government’s decree was unconstitutional, the project has resurfaced, allowing the government to continue with its original plans. Given the EU’s involvement through its strategic partnership immediately after the Court’s decision, a contentious debate was reignited within Serbia. It involved heated discussions involving government officials, opposition parties, civil society, academics, journalists, and environmental activists – that is, all relevant segments of society. In the meantime, the tragic deaths of 15 people in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city, following the collapse of a canopy at the newly reconstructed railway station on 1 November 2024 shifted the spotlight away from the Jadar project. Despite Serbia continuing to face various challenges, some of which may impact the daily socio-political agenda, the issue of mining has become so prevalent that it is likely to remain one of the key political fault lines shaping the country’s future. 

From the government’s perspective, the Jadar project has become one of the highlights of its consecutive terms in power. Facing significant resistance, the government backed down in 2022, essentially halting the project until June 2024, when the project was reinstated after the Constitutional Court deemed the government’s original decision to halt the project unconstitutional. Readily accepting the Court’s ruling, the government invested significant political capital to ensure no further disruptions took place. In fact, the government went on to compare the potential value of lithium for Serbia to that of oil for Saudi Arabia (Danas, 2024). The government further argued that, from a minimalist perspective, if the project is limited to the exploitation of lithium and other minerals, it will contribute approximately 1 per cent of the country’s annual GDP (NIN, 2024). At the same time, from a maximalist perspective, it suggested that the entire endeavour could account for up to 16.4 per cent of GDP if the full value chain is realised, including lithium processing, cathode production, and battery manufacturing in partnership with various companies. Although there is no consensus on the figures, the overall message of those in favour of the project is that, with it, Rio Tinto would become the biggest taxpayer in the country and the Jadar project the biggest greenfield investment in Serbia’s contemporary history, allowing Serbia to transform its economy in the years to come in preparation for future EU membership. 

Rio Tinto’s perspective

Box 1. Rio Tinto’s perspective 

Building on strong government support, Rio Tinto promotes the Jadar project as a potential win–win opportunity for Serbia and the company alike. According to Rio Tinto’s estimates, the project, at full production, would annually yield approximately 58,000 tons of refined battery-grade lithium carbonate, 160,000 tons of boric acid, and 255,000 tons of sodium sulphate, positioning the company among the world’s top ten lithium manufacturers (Rio Tinto, n.d.b). Over its projected 40-year lifespan, the mine is expected to produce a total of 2.3 million tons of lithium carbonate. With this extensive exploitation, Rio Tinto estimates a capital investment of at least €2.55 billion, on top of the €475 million already spent on preliminary studies, making Jadar the largest foreign direct investment project in Serbia’s modern history (Rio Tinto, n.d.a). The company also highlights the project’s economic benefits, including the creation of 1,300 permanent jobs and up to 3,500 temporary construction positions. Additionally, the company argues it plans to spend over €300 million annually on supplies, with 70 per cent sourced locally. Once fully operational, the company concludes, the project is projected to become one of Serbia’s largest taxpayers, contributing over €180 million annually in taxes and royalties – approximately 1 per cent of the country’s national budget revenue. In short, Rio Tinto projects an image as a company whose planned project will leave a positive mark on Serbia’s economy and state budget.  

Neither the government’s enthusiasm nor Rio Tinto’s (see Box 1) is reciprocated by the opposition parties or by the majority of citizens (N1, 2024c). They have continued to express deep concerns about the ecological footprint of such a project, fearing the degradation of landscapes, water contamination, and long-term harm to local ecosystems. In that case, the mineral would amount to, figuratively speaking, kryptonite – the fictional mineral used to fight Superman. Interestingly, when Jadarite was first discovered in the Jadar valley in 2007, the scientific community indicated that this mineral coincidentally contains the same elements as kryptonite (News in Science, 2007). This symbolic association underscores broader uncertainty and fear that, much like kryptonite, the Jadar project could have harmful or even irreparable consequences that would far outweigh the economic benefits (N1, 2024a). In fact, some have even gone as far as to completely dispute the economic promise of the project, showcasing that the revenues from the Jadar project would be negligible and thus calling for a halt to the project altogether (Radar, 2024). Given these reservations, this article outlines three contentious issues that deserve special attention: 1) the potential environmental risks posed by extraction, 2) widespread public mistrust in government institutions, and 3) concerns that the EU might reinforce stabilitocracy at the expense of democratic reforms. Each is examined in more detail in the next section, particularly as, if left unresolved, they could exacerbate existing tensions in the country. 

Identifying Serbia’s lithium-related challenges 

Firstly, the potential environmental footprint of mining activities from the Jadar project remains a significant point of contention in the public discourse. As previously indicated, the proposed project has sparked public protests and social resistance, as many citizens worry that the extraction processes could lead to substantial ecological degradation, affecting landscapes, water sources, and local biodiversity. Given the proximity of the town of Loznica, there are also fears about how its population could be affected. Furthermore, concerns have been raised about the potential degradation from the Jadar project exacerbating the already high levels of pollution, particularly from other projects in ‘black ecological spots’ in Serbia, such as Bor and Smederevo (where China currently operates) (Radulović, 2022). In addition, many view Rio Tinto as a company with a dubious reputation stemming from incidents of malpractice in other parts of the world. For example, a 2020 Australian parliamentary inquiry required it to reconstruct, at its own expense, a 46,000-year-old Aboriginal cave system that it had blown up and to provide compensation accordingly (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2020). Considering that Serbia is only ‘moderately’ prepared in the area of environment, as the European Commission noted in its 2024 annual report (European Commission, 2024d), these fears are likely to persist as long as the country struggles with enforcing environmental regulations and aligning policies with EU standards. 

Secondly, local opposition to lithium mining reflects a broader tension stemming from the low trust in government institutions, a sentiment that has only intensified amid concerns over the lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making processes. As highlighted in the European Commission’s annual reports, Serbia has practically stagnated in advancing key reforms in the rule of law area – despite engaging in accession talks for over a decade (Omeragic, Dimintrov, & Mitrović, 2024). Addressed under Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) in the EU accession negotiation process, the rule of law area encompasses areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption efforts, the fight against organised crime, and freedom of expression – each of which has proven very challenging for Serbia. In fact, in 2024, Serbia’s advancements on that front were very modest. For Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom, and Security), its level of preparedness moved from ‘some’ to a status between ‘some’ and ‘moderate’. However, for Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights), Serbia remained at the ‘some’ level of preparedness.⁶ Importantly, the same cluster encompasses the functioning of democratic institutions, with Serbia’s track record being labelled as ‘mixed’. Due to the persistent lack of necessary advancements in these areas, scepticism has grown among the public regarding the government’s ability to manage large-scale projects such as lithium mining in a way that genuinely serves the public interest. 

Finally, the potential economic benefits of lithium mining seem poised to flow primarily to foreign investors rather than to the communities most affected by its consequences. Notably, the guarantees provided by the European Commission and Germany have not produced the desired effect, even among Serbia’s pro-EU population, who have started accusing the EU of ‘neo-colonialism’. They warn that the EU will, for its own interests, turn Serbia into a dumping ground, while the government will profit from renewed external legitimacy. Such concerns are based on the belief that the established cooperation on lithium exploitation is yet another instance of the EU sacrificing its values in favour of strategic and economic interests (Ivković, 2024). This scepticism can be attributed to the perception that the EU has prioritised stability over democratic principles and genuine reforms in Serbia – a critique frequently voiced by the local think tank community and civil society in general (N1, 2024b). This phenomenon, often described as stabilitocracy, refers to a policy approach in which the EU supports stable yet semi-authoritarian regimes in the Western Balkans to maintain regional stability and reap other benefits, even when such governments show limited commitment to democratic reforms and the rule of law. Given these concerns, there is a real fear that the lithium project could unintentionally reinforce this stabilitocracy model by providing greater external legitimacy and financial backing to the Serbian government, further eroding democratic standards.  

Conclusion and a way forward

The analysis of the EU’s strategic direction and the identification of key concerns regarding the Jadar project have clearly outlined that Serbia’s lithium reserves embody both a strategic opportunity and a complex challenge. On the one hand, there is a clear interpretation that integrating Serbia into the EU’s critical materials supply chain could bolster the EU’s autonomy in sourcing raw materials that are vital for its green transition and strategic autonomy while simultaneously fostering stronger economic ties that might accelerate Serbia’s EU accession process. On the other hand, any missteps in addressing the environmental and social concerns vis-à-vis lithium mining could erode local support for EU integration in Serbia, fuelling scepticism around both the EU’s intentions and Serbia’s role. In such a complex situation, the EU needs to strike the right balance between the necessity to meet its CRMA goals and maintaining its credibility and commitment to the rule of law and environmental standards in the eyes of Serbian citizens. Considering the key challenges identified here, the EU needs to tailor its response accordingly. The following represents a possible response to some of the concerns as the EU continues to engage with Serbia as part of its accession talks.⁷  

 
The EU must recognise that concerns about environmental risks are so widespread and deeply entrenched that only a long-term strategy stands a chance of alleviating them. It is evident that the government of Serbia, if left to address this issue entirely on its own, is unlikely to succeed given its weak track record in tackling other ‘black spots’ across the country. While the 2024 strategic partnership signals the EU’s commitment to the project, deeper and sustained involvement is required beyond the one-time reassurances the European Commission and Germany gave on the day the Memorandum of Understanding was signed. The EU should engage in continuous, transparent dialogue with citizens, clearly outlining its role, interests, and how it is tackling similar mining and environmental issues within its own borders. Additionally, since Serbia opened Cluster 4 (Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity) in 2021, the EU has a unique opportunity to assist the Serbian government in informing the public about progress in aligning with EU environmental standards. Member States with strong environmental records should support the Commission’s efforts, showcasing how lithium exploitation is part of a broader EU vision for a sustainable, resilient, and independent Europe. Lastly, as the prospects of Serbia’s accession to the EU still remain distant, the EU should clarify how it will hold Serbia accountable and ensure that it meets the highest environmental standards, particularly as it lacks the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for a candidate country that it possesses for Member States. Engaging with all segments of society will become even more crucial if the Jadar project is granted strategic project status in the future, in accordance with the CRMA. 

Given the public’s deepening mistrust in the government’s ability to make responsible decisions and manage large-scale projects such as mining, as well as fears over stabilitocracy, it is crucial that the EU continues to emphasise the importance of the rule of law as part of Serbia’s accession process. In the short term, the key way for the EU to support Serbia’s democratic reforms is by strictly adhering to the conditionality principle outlined in the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which is materialised through the Reform and Growth Facility. The Facility, covering the period from 2024 to 2027, allocates €1.6 billion to Serbia (one-third in grants and two-thirds in loans), with access to these funds contingent on the fulfilment of reforms across all clusters, particularly the Fundamentals, as set out in Serbia’s Reform Agenda. The first quarter of 2025 presents a timely opportunity to test this commitment, as Serbia has already pledged to take specific actions by the end of 2024, including 1) organising a Working Group on the Coordination and Follow-up of Recommendations for Improving the Electoral Process, 2) conducting a meaningful audit of the voter register, and 3) re-electing the Council of the Regulatory Body for Digital Media, among others. In the long term, the EU should ensure that the conditionality principle is embedded, to the maximum extent possible, in the next instrument for pre-accession assistance as part of the EU’s next multi-annual financial framework covering the period between 2028 and 2034. Both the short-term and long-term suggestions need to be part of a strategic approach to enlarge to the Western Balkans, which is why the EU will need to persist in implementing commitments that will sustain the enlargement policy at the top of its agenda.  

Critical raw materials as the EU’s long-term objective: EU institutions’ perspective 

The adoption of the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in May 2024 stemmed from the sudden stark realisation that prolonged inaction had left the EU lagging while others secured dominance in critical resources. It took the COVID-19 pandemic for the European Commission to publish, in September 2020, a Communication on ‘Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards Greater Security and Sustainability’. Warning that ‘the stakes are high’, it highlighted that one of the lessons of the pandemic was the need to reduce dependency and strengthen diversity and security of supply. The pandemic acted as the initial shock, as the supply chains for essential medicines, as well as medical devices and equipment, were seriously impeded. For instance, China was the main EU partner for the import of face masks, supplying 92 per cent of this product in the first semester of 2020 (Eurostat, 2020). A year later, in November 2021, the European Parliament went in the same direction, adopting a Resolution on European strategy for critical raw materials (European Parliament, 2021). Building upon this economic logic, the Act emphasises that the EU ‘relies heavily on imports, often from a single third country, and recent crises have underlined EU strategic dependencies’ (European Commission, 2024b). To translate, the EU’s dependence on systemic rivals such as China became evident, and the COVID-19 pandemic exposed how unprepared the Union was to face global challenges. 

However, it was only after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine that the EU started to accelerate its work on this issue. With the outbreak of the war, the Union’s energy dependence on Russia became all the more exposed, limiting the EU’s capacity to take effective action.⁸ In fact, in March 2022, just two weeks after the war started, EU leaders adopted the Versailles Declaration, highlighting the importance of reducing ‘strategic dependencies’, identifying critical raw materials, and securing strategic partnerships as means to obtain them (European Union, 2022). As a response, six months later, the CRMA was announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2022 State of the Union speech, where she highlighted that ‘lithium and rare earths will soon be more important than oil and gas’ (Von der Leyer, 2022). Having listed lithium among the key critical raw materials, the CRMA was put into effect in May 2024. In line with it, all Member States have committed to the 2024–2029 Strategic Agenda, stating the necessity to ‘reduce harmful dependencies and diversify and secure strategic supply chains’ (European Council, n.d.). Moreover, in her speech on her second administration’s programme in November 2024, Von der Leyen clearly stated that critical raw materials are vital to reinforcing economic security, defined as one of the pillars of the newly introduced ‘Competitiveness Compass’ (Von der Leyen, 2024).⁹ With the consensus among all EU institutions on the importance of critical raw materials, the CRMA has become a landmark piece of EU legislation with the ambition to strategically redefine the EU’s global outlook.  

The EU’s newly adopted policy outlook is here to stay. Some concerns arose regarding the EU’s future direction in the aftermath of the European Parliament elections in June 2024, given that European citizens voted in favour of moving the EU towards the right of the political spectrum. Although a more right-leaning European Parliament might face more hurdles to adopt policies envisioned by the established political groups, the implementation of the CRMA will not be among those policies. The analysis of votes for the CRMA indicates that it has received overwhelming support from all but one political group despite the many ideological and policy differences between them (HowTheyVote.eu, 2023). Among those supporting the CRMA were the European People’s Party (EPP), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and Renew Europe (RE), which even committed in their Cooperation Statement to ‘enhance competitiveness in strategic industries’ (EPP, S&D, & RE, 2024). Beyond mainstream groups, the CRMA was also supported by the Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA), European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Identity and Democracy (ID), and even the Non-attached members (N/A). The only exception was the Left, the smallest political group, which demonstrated varying voting approaches, with 47 per cent of the group voting against, 34 per cent abstaining, and 19 per cent voting in favour. Consequently, the breakdown of all votes on the CRMA is as follows: 515 MEPs in favour (89 per cent), 34 against (6 per cent), and 28 abstentions (5 per cent). This alignment indicates that the consensus on the CRMA is one of the rare instances where different political groups share the same view, indicating that its future is promising and resistant to internal changes of political constellations. 

Economic and political logic of critical raw materials: A policy driver’s perspective  

Given that some lessons have been learnt, and political consensus has been generated, important contemporary policy drivers in the EU indicate in their work that the CRMA now needs to be used as a springboard for decisive action as the EU enters a new institutional cycle. Namely, the Letta Report states that the CRMA represents ‘a pivotal move’ to acknowledge and mitigate risks stemming from the fact that value chains of critical raw materials, including lithium, are significantly concentrated (Letta, 2024). As China is labelled as a country that is adopting ‘assertive strategies’, Letta calls for prompt implementation of the CRMA to ensure that the EU’s diversification activities are effective. One way of doing so is by ‘leveraging its collective purchasing power’ through a mechanism for the joint procurement of critical materials. Similarly, the Draghi Report warns of Europe’s notorious exposure to any ‘sudden stops’ in trade caused by ongoing geopolitical shifts (European Commission, 2024c). With 40 per cent of Europe’s imports sourced from a small number of suppliers, half of which are not strategically aligned with the EU, there is a risk of price volatility, which could hamper investment decisions and even push investors to scale up production in countries such as China. Currently, this Asian giant has the most extensive array of export restrictions on critical raw materials, involving bans, quotas, and export taxes, causing further risk of higher prices in the future. It is also the third-largest extractor of lithium (after Argentina and Chile), and the biggest processor of this material. Hence, the EU’s sustainable development will depend on effectively meeting the CRMA’s benchmarks in the years to come.    

While the economic logic of the CRMA is vital, the equally important – perhaps even more crucial – aspect is the political imperative of safeguarding decision-making autonomy. This is evident in both the Letta Report and the Draghi Report, which strongly emphasise that the EU’s severely restricted access to critical raw materials is creating a real risk of dependencies on the EU’s political decisions being dubbed down by its economic vulnerabilities. The more immediate risk for Europe is that dependencies could be exploited to create opportunities for coercion, making it harder for the EU to maintain a united stance and undermining its common policy objectives. A growing use of dependencies as a ‘geopolitical weapon’ is, in turn, likely to increase uncertainty and have a detrimental effect on business investment. That is why, for instance, the Draghi Report encourages both opening domestic mines and maximising the use of strategic partnerships with strategically aligned third countries. The Letta Report goes on to insist on the necessity of introducing ‘reshore or friend-shore’ critical production inputs as part of the EU’s de-risking of its ongoing cooperation with ‘rival partners’. Such interpretations indicate that the CRMA is more than just a tool for economic development; rather, it is a vital strategic tool whose effective implementation is intended to transform the EU by making it better prepared to face the increasingly complex challenges of the twenty-first century. 

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